transcript

Speaker 1:
[00:10] Welcome to The Proceedings Podcast. I'm Bill Hamblet, the Editor-in-Chief at the US. Naval Institute. It's Friday, April 17th, 2026. Good to have you on board, everybody. This episode is brought to you by Booz Allen. From rugged 5G on warships to unmanned systems deep below the ocean, Booz Allen builds technology that works where it matters most. Their AI-driven, mission-ready capabilities help the US. Navy operate and win in contested environments. No manual, no road map, no problem. Learn more at Booz allen.com/defense. All right, the U.S.-Israel war with Iran has been in a tenuous situation for about 10 days now. We're in a ceasefire from the kinetic strikes, but a US naval blockade of Iranian ports started on Monday, four days ago. Peace negotiations are ongoing with Pakistan. Today is my colleague, Paul Giarra, host of the Madison Grand Strategy Project Sea Power Workshop, and our special guest is HR. McMaster. General McMaster is a 1984 graduate of West Point, who served as a cavalry officer in the US. Army. He earned a Ph.D. in history from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. His thesis, Derreliction of Duty, became a New York Times bestseller. He's a combat veteran of Operation Desert Storm, Iraqi freedom, and enduring freedom. He commanded the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and Fort Benning, and the Maneuver Center of Excellence. He later served as the Deputy Commanding General of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, and General McMaster served as the National Security Advisor from 2017 to 2018 during the first Trump administration. He's now a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford. General, Paul, welcome to the show.

Speaker 2:
[01:56] Good to be here, Bill.

Speaker 3:
[01:57] Hey, Bill and Paul, great to be with you guys. I'm a huge fan of Proceedings, so real honor. Thank you.

Speaker 2:
[02:02] Awesome.

Speaker 1:
[02:03] Thank you, sir. So, sir, how does the Iran conflict fit within the broader framework of great power competition? And does it distract from or does it reinforce deterrence against China?

Speaker 3:
[02:17] You know, Bill, that's going to depend on the outcome. But the way that it fits in to this broader competition is that I think what we're facing today is what we could call an axis of aggressors. This centers on two revanchist or revisionist powers on the Eurasian landmass of China and Russia who have pulled into the fold, Iran, the theocratic dictatorship there, and the only hereditary communist dictatorship of the world in North Korea. So, hey, I think Iran is very important to this axis of aggressors. They provide each other tremendous material support as well as diplomatic support and other financial and economic support. For example, it is Iran who's provided Russia, you know, with the Shahed drones that they're using for their continued onslaught against Ukraine. China underwrites the efforts of both Russia and Iran with the purchases of energy to feed the ATMs in both of those countries, purchasing 90% of Iran's oil. Russia and China support Iran with commensural military capabilities, the missile capabilities, the fuel components that Iran needs for its missiles, as well as diplomatic cover in formal partnerships, defense agreements between Russia, Iran and China and Iran. So hey, it is a central part of the competition with this axis of aggressors. If this war succeeds in affecting a change in the nature of the Iranian government such that it ceases permanent hostility to the great Satan, you know, us, the little Satan Israel, its Arab neighbors, China and Russia are the big losers in the Middle East because it's they're portraying themselves as a hedge, a way to constrain Iran that has given them influence with the Gulf States, for example. And this war could end, I believe, with a fundamentally different Iranian regime that better reflects the aspirations and attitudes of its people and Iran and Russia. Yeah, as I mentioned, with no influence left in the Middle East and with the US holding the keys to China's gas station. So yes, I think it's a central part of the competition.

Speaker 2:
[04:31] Thank you, General. Do you think the effort to coerce Iran to give up its nuclear and ballistic missile program will work? Does Iran's regime have a rational offer they'd accept, one the US government could also accept? I'm asking this not to second-guess our negotiators, but because you know so much about Iran and Iranian culture.

Speaker 3:
[04:51] Well, like all of us, I'm just a student of Iran and Iranian culture. But what I think what we tend to undervalue is, as you're suggesting, is the ideology that drives and constrains the Iranian leadership. The degree to which this hostility, to the great Satan, the little Satan, and the cancerous boils they refer to Israel, I think that we undervalue the degree to which that ideology drives and constrains them. And, of course, really results in their deep reluctance to give up the most destructive weapons on earth. Yeah, actually, because I think they want to use them. They want to use them as cover so they can have their way in the region, as they have in large measure, since 1979, at least since 1983, by using proxies to keep the Arab world perpetually enmeshed in conflict, in these sectarian civil wars, perpetually weak, so they can extend their hegemonic influence to the Mediterranean, surround Israel with a ring of fire, and light that ring of fire as they did on October 7, 2023. They're not going to give them up unless they're forced to give them up. Paul, I think the key is we have to convince them that hanging on to the nuclear program, hanging on to this thousand pounds of highly rich uranium, or try to reconstitute these capabilities would only result in more devastation for them. I think this is more not persuading them, it's really imposing our will. What we've done that I think has been really full hearty in the past, is we have separated diplomatic efforts with Iran from what we were doing militarily. We weren't responding to scores, hundreds even, of acts of Iranian aggression through their proxies. We relaxed economic sanctions, gave them huge cash payoffs, and then we wondered why we're not getting anywhere with diplomacy, or while they're violating the agreements that they do sign. So I think this is really the first time, this in Midnight Hammer and the Israeli 12-day campaign of last summer, that we've actually began to act like we know what the return address is, for so much violence against us, the Gulf States and their Arab neighbors and Israel, what the source has been for decades.

Speaker 1:
[07:10] I love that phrase, that we know where the return address is for that violence that's been aimed at us since 1979. Yeah, that's a great point. So this conflict, a lot of people would say this conflict came on very quickly. It caught the world, the American people and Iran by surprise. There wasn't a traditional road to war that included the president building a public case for the need to use military force. Some say that that was necessary to achieve surprise, others, including a lot of our allies, say that without gaining that buy-in in advance of the war, the administration undercut the legitimacy of the operation. So just in your opinion, which is more important, the element of surprise or building public and diplomatic support before taking action?

Speaker 3:
[07:54] Well, Bill, I'm just going to say they're both important and you can pursue both. I think it's okay that the president didn't say, this is HR., this is one we're going to attack against Iran. But laying the groundwork for this, I think there should have been many conversations, some deep conversations about the nature of the Iranian regime, its threat to the world, including to Europe and our allies and partners in Asia, the sharing of intelligence to show how they were really desperate to deepen their magazines of missiles and drones and how this really was forming a conventional curtain of this missile drone strike complex behind which they were rekindling their nuclear program and developing an ICBM and so forth. So I think that really, we kind of blew it. We could have had those kinds of conversations over time. We could have talked to our European allies in terms of theoreticals. You know, hey, if military operations against Iran does become vital, and we think that we have no other option, then what can we count on you for? You know, because we're probably going to have to have a sustained effort to keep open the Strait of Hormuz, for example. Certainly, there are many examples of us working together in the area of missile and drone defense in the theater, especially with the direct Iranian attacks against Israel in 2024, in April and October of 2024. So, hey, I think there's a lot more that could have been done there, and a lot more could have been done in Congress, I think, just by briefing them on the threat, briefing them on Iranian activities and the intelligence that was leading to this decision. So, and then what I would have highlighted in particular, you know, and really beat the drum about, ever since it happened was the mass murder, you know, of 40,000 Iranians in a 48-hour period, right? So, what's happened is because of that lack of diplomatic effort and communications effort and the inconsistency of the communications effort, at times the unseriousness of it has created this space for the Iranian regime, you know, who's been waging this proxy war for 47 years to appear like it's the victim. It's crazy. So, I think, you know, I think we really blew it, you know. We could have had, we could have achieved operational surprise, a strategic surprise, and still, I think, built, you know, a higher degree of support, you know, for the war in the United States, in the Congress, and abroad as well.

Speaker 1:
[10:40] Yeah, I think that's a good point, that both are necessary, right? Surprise is necessary, tactical, if not operational surprise, but also having those conversations with allies and partners and with political leaders on, you know, domestic political leaders, you know, just to build the case for it. Sir, just a quick follow up to that. Do you think we're on the outset of American preemptive wars, or is this, are we setting a precedent here that we're going to see more American military preemption around the world?

Speaker 3:
[11:10] You know, I don't think so, Bill, and the reason that I don't think that is, again, I would say, hey, this wasn't a decision to go to war, this was a decision to sort of introduce a new phase of a 47-year-long war. And I would point out, you know, obviously, the hostage crisis in 79, the mass murder of Marines in Beirut in 1983, and the attack on the US. Embassy there, and the French Commando is there for that matter, you know, the worldwide terrorist campaign, you know, the scores, I guess, I think really hundreds of attacks against US forces and personnel in recent years across the Middle East, the 600-plus soldiers who were killed by Iranian proxies armed with Iranian-manufactured roadside bombs during the Iraq War. So I would say no, because you can make the argument, hey, with these people who are there, chanting death to America and pursuing the most destructive weapons on earth in an effort to continue under the cover of those most destructive weapons, the sustained war against us. Hey, I think you've got a strong argument there, Bill. It isn't an argument for preventive war or even a preemptive war. It's an argument for ending an ongoing war on our terms.

Speaker 2:
[12:33] General, thank you. I really appreciate the way you're answering these questions because it's neither one or the other. It's something else sometimes. Operation Epic Fury has resurfaced the debate about war powers and the role of Congress in declaring war, funding war, and either facilitating or constricting the executive branch's freedom of action. Where do you come down on the balance of power between Congress and the executive branch when it comes to warfare?

Speaker 3:
[13:01] Well, as a historian, you have to realize that rarely has there been a declaration of war. And it's been the exception rather than the rule. And there are broad authorities that the president enjoys under Article 2 of the Constitution. And like in previous instances, there's a judicial review of presidential action. The one I was personally involved in was where the strikes against the Assad regime and the Kanshikuna airfield in April of 2017, which we did with congressional consultation with the Gang of Eight prior to to remain, to maintain operational security and then had broad conversations with Congress. It's unusual because we've employed force many times without it. I think in the most controversial recent war, which was the invasion of Iraq in 2003, President Bush actually got congressional approval for that, and many of the people who voted for that war, I guess, forgot about that or found it convenient to forget that they voted for the war because they were engaged in scoring partisan political points against the Bush administration when the war became kind of tough. So anyway, I think back to Thomas Jefferson, Paul as a historian and the Barbary Pirates. I look at the Iranians as almost a more destructive and modern day form of the Barbary Pirates and see this campaign as well within the president's Article 2 authorities. Hey, but that doesn't mean you shouldn't try to bring Congress and the American people along with you.

Speaker 2:
[14:46] Sure. Thank you. That's great.

Speaker 1:
[14:48] Sir, how do you evaluate the Navy's ability to restore and sustain freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz? Is the strait the right center of gravity for a naval campaign, or does focusing there, does it play to Iran's asymmetric strengths?

Speaker 3:
[15:04] Well, are you going to ask an army cavalry guy that, man? All my naval friends will be saying, what the hell are you talking about? You don't know what you're talking about, and I don't know what I'm talking about. So I would just say, I am amazed at the professionalism of our naval forces and the whole joint force, and their ability to work together. Gosh, Admiral Bradley and his team, I think you're doing a fantastic job orchestrating this, and all the CENTCOM component commands, and obviously our sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines. So hey, I'm blown away by that. I do think there are a range of capabilities that I've heard my naval officer friends talking about that we wish we had not divested. This is, I guess, more of the frigate capabilities, the capabilities that the monitoring capabilities, although we have new tech, as you know, they're being employed on other platforms. So, you know, I don't know, I would defer to the real professionals on this, but I do think your point about, hey, do we have the right focus? Hey, I like the way that we're implementing this blockade. I mean, you don't have to go to the Iranian ports, you know, you can just sit, you know, further back in the Gulf of Oman and enforce it, or enforce it in the international waters, wherever those ships are moving, much like we did with the Ghost Fleet that was part of the illicit oil trade from Adoro. So, the one thing I'm concerned about is, hey, are we getting the most advanced capabilities to our naval forces? Because I think we have a bow way of deferred modernization across all services. And my biggest concern, and I think the naval proceedings crowd will agree with me, is capacity. Man, our Navy's just too damn small, you know? And so is our Air Force, and so is our Army, I would say, you know? And what we have seen, I think, is our potential enemy's ability to compensate for what had been our most exquisite capabilities that amounted to our differential advantages and our ability to project power with relatively small forces across wider and wider areas. And now what we see is, hey, this is a multi-theater commitment we've got to US security from the Caribbean to the Middle East to the support that we're giving you through the Europeans now to the Ukrainians and, hey, the Indo-Pacific. So I think we are in a real crunch time here. And I hope that the presidents bump up in the defense budget, the almost 50% increase. I hope that goes through and hope we sustain it because as all of us know, hey, we're spending the lowest on defense in terms of percentage of GDP since the interwar period. And the world, I think we can all agree, is a pretty darn dangerous place. And I think we can also all agree, it's a hell of a lot cheaper to prevent a war than to have to fight one. And the way you prevent it is convincing your adversary, who could be your potential enemy, that they can accomplish their objectives through the use of force at an acceptable cost and risk. And the way you do that is with forward deployed capable joint forces. And our naval forces are absolutely foundational to that deterrent capability.

Speaker 1:
[18:17] That's a pretty good answer for an army guy, sir.

Speaker 3:
[18:20] Hey, I've talked around it, man. I don't know. I mean, I've been on the ships a couple of times, but that's it. But if you're asking me about tanks, I'd say, hey, I'll talk about that all day. Try to think of a problem you can't solve with a tank. You can't, right?

Speaker 2:
[18:37] General, we may have to splice the maybrace here any minute. I'd like to follow up on the issue of capabilities in a somewhat broader sense. Are we seeing a new step change, revolution in military affairs play out, combining new technologies, doctrines, and organizations? There's an awful lot of discussion about the new capabilities that are being used, long-range drones, advanced EW, all sorts of things. Tactical integration of on-orbit capabilities and artificial intelligence. But there's also the change in doctrines, I would argue is from prevention, despite what you just said, excuse me, prevention versus avoidance, and organizations, unprecedented integration with Israel in the IDF, for instance.

Speaker 3:
[19:27] Yeah. I think what you're seeing, Paul, what we're seeing is a very significant, dramatic, fast change in the evolution of warfare. But we're also seeing some critical continuities. I think the changes have to do with, the term that we came up with when I was working with General Dave Perkins at TRADOC was multi-domain warfare, and this wasn't new, right? We always project power from one domain to another. But what we were saying is, the integration of capabilities across those domains is going to become even more important. What we would have to do is integrate capabilities across those domains to create windows of opportunity for freedom of movement and action against our enemies. This included obviously the evolving and rapidly advancing capabilities in cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare, obviously the surface and subsurface in the maritime domain, the aerospace and land domains, but especially space and low earth orbit in particular in space. When I look at what's happened in recent conflicts, in ongoing conflicts, I guess I should say, in the Middle East and in Ukraine, is the increased transparency of the battlefield, such that forces who would operate in greater depth in the battle area, now have to behave as if they're in visual range of the enemy because of the surveillance capability, the AI capabilities, the long-range precision strike capabilities. This has a lot to do with autonomous and uncrewed systems, but it has a lot to do with low-earth orbit, RF and imagery and so forth. So what are the implications? I think the implications are the first campaign, or the opening of the first campaign, is going to have to center on how to blind and deceive the enemy. And that will be across all domains. And hey, the next war is going right into low-earth orbit from the beginning, I think. And so what you see, I think, is the tactical problem, operational problem, I guess strategic problem in Ukraine, is the degree to which they have lost freedom of movement and action, the ability to conduct sustained offensive operations on both sides. And therefore, the front line looks like the Western front in World War I. And the problem set is a little bit different, right? In World War I, it was what the Germans called materielschlacht, you know, massive artillery. And their answer to that was Houdier tactics, infiltration tactics, you know, to get behind enemy lines, to attack high-value targets. That's exactly what the Russians are doing right now, you know. On the defensive side, the Germans came up with elastic defense. You know, a very thin forward line of troops centered on machine guns, now centered on first-person view drones. And then greater depth to escape the range of the artillery, now to escape, you know, the 40-kilometer or so range of FPV drones. And so, I think that what you're looking at is this situation in which the weapons of war, you know, the tools that are enabling warfare are fundamentally different and far advanced. But the result is the Western Front in World War I. And so, now what we have to do is employ the countermeasures necessary to regain freedom of movement and action, you know, kind of like what the tank did in World War I. And then, of course, certainly the entry of US forces after unrestricted submarine warfare brought the US into the war.

Speaker 1:
[22:57] Sir, can I follow up a little bit on that? Because one of the things that struck me as you were talking about all these capabilities, first person view drones and, you know, what's resulted in Ukraine where things have just really gotten mired down, right? Admiral Poparo, he spoke to the Midshipmen at the Naval Academy last week and talked about the democratization of weapon systems now. That, you know, everybody, I mean, you look at what the Iranians have, you look at what the Ukrainians have, the Russians have, you know, these first person view or unmanned systems that are just wreaking havoc. Is there a way for the United States to kind of get back without spending money on just on exquisite systems? But is there a way to get back on top of that cost curve, right? On top of that, hey, we're having a hard time with the Iranians. We're having a hard time with the Houthis. We're having a hard time helping the Ukrainians get ahead of the Russian threat. How do we and our allies get back on top of that sort of bow wave, I guess?

Speaker 3:
[24:03] Yeah, well, of course, there are a number of things we have to do. We have to develop countermeasures to these capabilities. Certainly, the Ukrainians have been really good at this, right? And this is the use of these kind of quadcopter drones that can rapidly accelerate and act as a very effective countermeasure to the Shahed drones, for example. And they're exporting this capability now to the Gulf States. And of course, we need to adopt those capabilities. We need something probably a little bit less than the $3.5 million PAC-3 missile or the $13.5 million THAAD missile to take these things down. And we have them, right? And companies have developed these. I mean, there are a lot of low-cost air defense missile systems that are now under procurement. I mean, the US company, I think, just sealed a huge deal with some of the Gulf States for some of these lower cost capabilities. But then, of course, there are other new countermeasures coming online, especially directed-energy weapon systems. And because these drones are pretty lightweight, because they need that to be light for the range and to carry the payload, you can burn a hole in those things pretty easily at a relatively low cost. And then, of course, we need more advanced radar systems, and we need to really work on short-range air defense as well, so that wherever we have forces, say if we were to take Carg Island to control 80% of Iran's oil exports, we would need an air defense bubble around that formation. And so our short-range air defense is, of course, immensely important as well. So, hey, basically, I think we need it all. We need all of those capabilities, and we have to obviously put into place some of the changes in procurement and contracting that you see the Department of War putting in. I mean, I think this is a real bright spot, actually. What Deputy Secretary of War, Steve Feinberg, is doing is fantastic. We've all known about this for a while because we follow this stuff. There was a journal piece about it this week. He's doing things that we thought would never maybe get done in the Pentagon. So I think we have an opportunity to integrate a lot of these newer capabilities. But still, this is not the solution. We still need some of our exquisite capabilities. Hey, it turns out the F-35 came in kind of handy at the beginning of this operation. And our B-1 and B-2 bombers, and once you have a Periscope Air Defense Environment, or if you need a strike like you had in Midnight Hammer, you need that capability as well. You need naval aviation as well as land-based aviation. I just think the Joint Force Commander needs a range of options. And if you think about the threat, as you've described it, really the homeland is not safe anymore. If you look at Operation Spiderweb and so forth. But what I see is like the opportunity to defend ourselves is best abroad because the cost of dealing with these threats reach an exorbitant cost once they hit our shores. So it's effective intelligence combined with capable forward-positioned US forces. And this equates to missile defense as well, right? If you're dealing with a hypersonic threat, you want to be able to take that out in the boost phase, you know, before it reaches the velocity and is able to maneuver in ways that make it really hard to shoot that missile down.

Speaker 1:
[27:26] Yeah, best to keep it in a way game, right?

Speaker 3:
[27:29] Absolutely.

Speaker 1:
[27:29] Yeah. Sir, mindful of your time, and we need to wrap things up a little bit here. If you were the National Security Advisor today, what are one or two things that you'd be most worried Washington isn't paying enough attention to?

Speaker 3:
[27:46] Well, the first, I would say, it would be the economic dimension of these competitions and the way that they integrate into our ability to defend the nation. I know that the administration is aware of these threats in terms of various forms of Chinese economic aggression. Certainly, they're aware of China's grip on critical supply chains, and how all this relates to our defense industrial base and our ability to produce weapons and munitions at scale. They're getting after this, but I think this is absolutely integrated, this competition, with national security. And I would tee up options for the president to gain an advantage and reduce our vulnerability to Chinese economic coercion in particular. And the second would be the combinations of technologies and how these combinations of technologies really represent a very significant threat. I'm thinking back to the old book, and you can tell it's a period piece from the 60s because of the title, but Men, Machines and Modern Times by Elton Morrison. And he uses actually one of the great chapters in there is about continuous-aim naval gunfire and how it took a combination of a number of technologies and innovative techniques and a new doctrine and everything to really develop that capability. And so when you look at artificial intelligence and what it can deliver in the area of genetic AI and physical AI and how that's going to affect really all sectors from manufacturing, which could be a big help to us, but also like bioengineering. I'll tell you, I mean, Bill, I don't know how much Proceedings is looking at essays on this topic. I think I saw one of maybe even a couple of years ago, but I think the combination of bioengineering and AI could hold great promise, obviously. Maybe it could cure male pattern baldness, I don't know. But it could cure a lot of things. But hey, it could develop a lot of pathogens, and we know that the Chinese have these kind of things under development. So I would say the danger posed by combinations of technologies and technologies in the hands of an adversary, a potential enemy that isn't going to adhere to the ethical standards that we would adhere to.

Speaker 1:
[30:06] That's a great point. I'll give it to my partner Paul for one last, if he's got a quick question or any closing thoughts, and then over you, sir, to kind of wrap things up.

Speaker 2:
[30:18] I have a quick question. If we raise our sights a little bit above the capabilities issues that we've been discussing for the last couple of minutes. General, you know a lot about this. Have we lost our allies in the course of asserting American interests? Can we bring them back or keep them on side while asserting those interests that they might not agree with?

Speaker 3:
[30:39] Well, like we're doing our best to alienate a large number of our allies, especially those in Europe. I mean, enough with the gratuitous insults and picking on Canada. And so they're threatening to invade Denmark. And I mean, oh, my gosh. And then big surprise when you ask them to help you out a little bit after you insulted them consistently, they're reluctant to do so. Hey, but what I would say is there are legitimate concerns we have with our allies. In this case, this is a holdover from many of our allies in Europe and Canada is in this category who were spending a hell of a lot on social programs, 50 percent of the world's social spending in Europe, and not doing it, not investing in defense. And so Americans and American taxpayers and President Trump, and many of those who support President Trump are like, hey, what the hell are we doing underwriting European social programs by covering their defense bills? That's a legitimate gripe. But hey, the president is getting what he wants now. He's getting them to invest more in defense. Some countries you're going to have problems with. I mean, Pedro Sanchez in Spain, the guy's a communist, okay? What do you expect? He's a communist. And then I don't know why we coddled him, but Orban was a jerk in Hungary. We've got our issues with Erdogan. But those are issues, work them out. Be hard-nosed, hell yeah. But don't look past the tremendous value of the alliance and what it allows us to do from a military perspective, with basing and overflight and the range of complementary capabilities, but also from an economic perspective. If you're worried about Chinese economic aggression, wouldn't it be great to have Europe come with you? And then certainly, I think we have had a closer relationship, obviously, with the Gulf States as a result of what's happening here. It's a mixed bag, obviously. And then Japan and South Korea, the relationships seem to be pretty darn strong. So I think we ought to emphasize, you know, repairing trust in the transatlantic relationship. But the Europeans, they got to take a few steps toward us too, you know, and say, hey, guys, you know, we hear you about the lack of burden sharing. And we're willing to do more, you know, on some of these issues, Arctic security, missile defense. The president wants Golden Dome. Hey, tough to do without Greenland and Canada, you know, and the Nordic states. So, hey, I think our interests are aligned, Paul. You know, gravity is going to bring us back together. Like, the threats aren't going away. The Russian threat is not going away. I think US leadership and the NATO alliance is indispensable. I mean, who's going to lead Europe without the United States? I mean, France? I don't think so. You know, I mean, so I think, and some of the capabilities we provide, especially the nuclear umbrella, you know, for example, you know, other nations just can't replicate that. You know, so I just think gravity is going to pull us back together. That's enough with the gratuitous insults. Let's work on having the best of both worlds, which is restored trust with a much more capable alliance.

Speaker 1:
[33:31] In previews of coming attractions in the May Proceedings, we've got an article by Eric Wertheim, who runs our Combat Fleets column and is the author of the Combat Fleets book or several different iterations. And his, it's probably a four or five pager, is all about the recapitalization of NATO navies, non-U.S. NATO navies. So it's pretty apparent a lot of those countries have gotten the message that they have to rebuild their navies too. And there's a major NATO Navy recapitalization effort just about across almost every one of the NATO countries that has a Navy. They're in building mode right now. So I think they're getting that message loud and clear. General, any save rounds, any closing remarks from you?

Speaker 3:
[34:18] The last thing is that anybody wants to restore their confidence in the younger generation, go to Annapolis tomorrow and watch the Army Navy Rugby match. Those are the true warriors, man. And no matter what the outcome is, you will leave that match inspired.

Speaker 2:
[34:36] Awesome, awesome.

Speaker 1:
[34:37] All right, our guest today has been former National Security Advisor, retired Army Lieutenant General HR. McMaster. Sir, we know you're in high demand. We can't thank you enough for your time and insights today.

Speaker 3:
[34:48] No, hey, what a pleasure to be with you. Go Navy. Good to see you guys.

Speaker 1:
[34:51] This episode is brought to you by Booz Allen. From rugged 5G on warships to unmanned systems deep below the ocean, Booz Allen builds technology that works where it matters most. Their AI-driven mission-ready capabilities help the US Navy operate and win in contested environments. No manual, no roadmap, no problem. Learn more at boozallen.com/defense. If you like the show, ring the bell, subscribe, tell a friend. Until next episode, remember, victory begins at The Naval Institute.