transcript

Speaker 1:
[00:01] I really think this is the point at which we really need to work hard on the diplomatic aspects of this.

Speaker 2:
[00:12] I'm host Michael Allen with Beacon Global Strategies. Today I'm joined by General Joseph Votel, former commander of US Central Command. General Votel has also served as the commander of the US Special Operations Command. General Votel joins us today for a discussion on the latest in Iran, including the status of negotiations and the outlook for a continued ceasefire. Stay with us as we speak with General Joe Votel. General Joe Votel, welcome back to NatSec Matters.

Speaker 1:
[00:46] Great to be with Michael.

Speaker 2:
[00:47] Well, thanks for coming back when you were on previously. We got a bunch of good feedback that people really loved it. We discussed whether it was possible to come into Iran, figure out a way to take out the highly enriched uranium, and people really loved those details. Maybe we'll get back into that today as well. But let's take it from the top. Here we are. We're in a ceasefire. The president has renewed it, seemingly for some period of time, as long as the Iranians are negotiating, as long as the two parties are talking. But this sounds like a moment to sort of step back and evaluate how the campaign went. And based on your long and storied career, especially at Central Command, what's your sense of how everything looks now?

Speaker 1:
[01:52] Yeah, thanks, Michael. That's interesting to kind of review all of this here. I mean, my view has not really changed over the last several weeks, particularly from a military standpoint. And I think we have done some substantial damage to the Iranian regime's military capabilities or ability to project power. It's not absolute. We've seen they've been able to generate missiles and drones. And just in the last 24 hours, apparently the ability to see ships in the in the in the Straits of Hormuz. So it's not absolute. But, you know, I think the military did what it was asked to do in terms of, you know, substantially treating the missile, the drone capabilities and the associated, you know, industrial bases, you know, removing the Navy and putting a lot of pressure on the regime. I think we did that. That said, I think, you know, where I am right now, I think it's a real, it's a big reminder, I think, for our listeners, that the military can do a lot, but it can't do it all. And it can't really be decisive in terms of this, in terms of getting to some type of solution or some type of end state. So we really now are beginning to see the other elements of national power and their importance in bringing this to a conclusion, whether it's economic or diplomacy or whether the power of our information and ideas, those all really have to have to kick in at this point.

Speaker 2:
[03:30] Yes, sir. So I think one of the primary achievements here, as you mentioned, is the attacks on their defense industrial base. From most accounts, I think that was pretty complete. Is there anything in particular with regard to that or the degradation of the ballistic missiles or do you just generally say, you know what, we can't get them all, we substantially degraded them and that counts as success.

Speaker 1:
[04:05] Well, you know, we struck what we knew or assessed, I think. And, you know, I think what we have to appreciate about, you guys have to have an element of respect for your adversaries here. And what we have to respect about Iran's military is their ability to do things underground, to conceal it and to protect it. And so, you know, I think there is, there probably is a fair amount of their stores, whether missiles or drones or others, that were in protected locations or places we couldn't see and couldn't assess. And we're, you know, kind of a little bit out of sight and beyond our ability to effectively target. So that that I think still still probably, you know, portends a challenge for us down the line. I think the disruption of the industrial base is really important because that does is that does put the real reliance on what they have left and not what they're going to be able to produce in the near term. And it will take us some significant effort to reconstitute those, those capabilities so they can get back up to, you know, kind of a production rate for some of these systems. So I think that is that is a little bit more of a lasting effect. But but clearly the Iranians, you know, have some capabilities they were able to protect from our from our attacks.

Speaker 2:
[05:27] Yes, sir. All right. Let's move to what's actually going on in the straits today. First of all, did you think it was sort of a good geopolitical move for the president to announce that we're going to blockade Iranian ports? And I assume as a military man, as a general that someone that was very senior at Centcom, that this is within the powers of the United States military to do this consistently over time.

Speaker 1:
[06:02] Yeah. Well, I certainly do think it's in the ability of the military to do it. Sustainment of this, of course, is likely that we can sustain this. Sustainment comes with a cost. It comes with the cost of readiness and deploying resources from other areas to make sure that we can do that. We certainly have enough in the United States Navy and across the broader joint force to continue to sustain this for as long as we need to. But I think we have to recognize there's a cost associated with that. There's nothing is free here. We don't have that much excess capacity that we can just do this and then do everything else we need to do. There has to be some trade-offs that are going to have to be made with that. And that will be important work for the joint staff and Department of Defense and the combatant commands to make sure that we're balancing our risks. So I'll just say that out front. You know, in terms of the idea of the blockade, my feeling is, I think, once again, I think the president, I think the administration was trying to ramp up pressure on the regime. And I think it's important not to just think about the blockade as a military capability, but it really has an economic capability as well. And that's really what it's designed to do is to impact that. And I think what it had the effect of doing was putting us back in a position where we were exercising control in the Straits of Hormuz. And I think that was really, really important. You know, I think the other thing we saw, and we haven't really seen all that much public discussion about it, is that in the immediate time after that, we also sent a couple of our destroyers up through the Straits of Hormuz to kind of begin to open a passage through the Straits of Hormuz that's much closer to the Omani side of the Strait. And of course, I think we're continuing to kind of proof that out. I think doing both those things is really, really, I think those are important things to do, and I think it is to our benefit to do that. So I think it's an advantage for us right now to have the blockade in place.

Speaker 2:
[08:15] Let's assume that this doesn't have an intended effect and that the Iranians do more of what they've just done apparently today, which is to take shots at oil tankers. And this will maybe have a chilling effect if anybody was thinking of going through the strait. Do you think the option of an escort mission is feasible? Do you get the sense that Centcom has recommended it? Talk a little bit about, like, if you were there, is this something you would be urging on the president?

Speaker 1:
[08:58] Well, I think certainly the option of an escort mission is always one that's available to us. And hopefully this would be a mission that we might be able to entice some of our international partners to join in to assist with. Although while there is still kind of a level of violence in the Straits of Hormuz, that may be a little bit of a dampening effect. But certainly it's within the capability. I mean, I think we can do all these things. There are associated risks and ramifications with all of this in terms of resources and other things we can do and stuff like that. I think it's going to all be balanced out. So I do think we can do this. My gut feeling, however, is that I think the effort going forward should be really less on trying to ramp up militarily. I think we've done a lot to do that right now. I really think this is the point at which we really need to work hard on the diplomatic aspects of this and begin to, you may perhaps bring some others into this. I mean, Pakistan has done a great job, you know, kind of keeping this on at the top of the stack. And communicating to our leadership and to the Iranian leadership, really, really good here. But, you know, fundamentally, I don't think these negotiations are going to move forward unless there is an element of some trust in this. And we've got to, I think we've got to really double our efforts in this particular area. That doesn't necessarily mean just the United States or the Vice President going to Pakistan or something else. It means engaging the broader international community to come in and begin to address this problem and put proper pressure on this. I think a real challenge for us is, has been talking about in the media here, at least in the last 24 hours is, what is this regime? Who is in charge and who's calling the shots? I think this is important. And so in addition to, you know, kind of our military status and pushing on the diplomatic stuff, we really got to double down on making sure we understand what we're dealing with here and how we influence that, to actually get to some kind of decision that's beneficial to us and one that they can come to grips with as well.

Speaker 2:
[11:19] Okay, good. I will ask you about the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in those stories just in a second. I had heard from someone that, and I hear you move towards diplomacy, that the military campaign had maybe begun to reach a point of diminishing returns. I wonder if you think that makes sense. And the president has said so many times that he's going to go hit power plants and bridges and then he never does. And so I wonder if you thought it was wise for him to just go ahead and take force off the table here for the foreseeable future.

Speaker 1:
[11:56] Well, I don't know that we necessarily need to take force off the table. I do think we would be benefited by a little more careful communication strategy with all of this. I do think the Iranians are playing off a lot of the loose rhetoric that's coming out of our government right now around this situation and I don't know that that helps us. So I think a more careful communication strategy would be really, really important. In terms of the military, you know, I mean, we can do more. I think there could be more damage done, but I do think that we are approaching a point where there would be diminishing returns from that, that it would just be more damage to things we've already damaged or maybe just making the situation more difficult to move forward in the diplomatic realm. I think having force there is really, really important. I think it backs up our diplomacy. I mean, that's the whole idea of it at this stage. But again, I don't know what more the military can do that is going to compel the regime to come to the table any more than we already have.

Speaker 2:
[13:14] Yeah. Yeah. I think you're right. I think they're dug in and we have to move towards this economic pressure and to keep it up. So, the big news, of course, as we've referenced, is the fighting, in a sense, that's going on in the Straits. The Iranians shooting at tankers. We've turned around a couple of ships so far. This is what I think people are afraid of, which is we're in a very tense situation and there could be unforeseen consequences or escalation. How nervous would you be about this if you were at Centcom today, or do you think this is manageable?

Speaker 1:
[14:00] Well, I think that we are in a little bit of an escalation trap here. I mean, we have put in the blockade and now we've seen some of the things that Iran has done over the last couple of days here in terms of seizing ships and shooting on ships. And I mean, I think so that is that's kind of an escalation in and of itself. You know, I think we sometimes think of this escalation strategy as escalating to a point where our adversaries are going to begin looking for off-ramps. We have not seen that yet. And that's, I think, what would be most concerning to me at this particular point. If I were still in the position, I'm not. So it's easy for me to talk about this. But I would be very, very concerned about that, about a regime that does not seem to be reading the messages that we're trying to send them through our own escalatory activities and continues to escalate within their own means at almost every step. That I think is concerning. I think as any military commander, I think would have to treat this as a very concerning area here. We're well beyond the standard operating methods in the Straits of Hormuz here, and there are hundreds of ships at rest. There are others trying to run the blockade. We've got American ships in place. People are trying to evade through it. So this, I think, is a very, very tense situation, and I think if I was in a position, this would require, I think, the majority of my attention here as we move forward.

Speaker 2:
[15:43] Right. When we fired at this ship the other day and turned them around, we recorded a video of that and released it, which I thought was a great idea because it was an illustration of our deterrent effect. I wonder if you might mention how much of a deterrent effect do you think we've been able to demonstrate so far, and will that cause pause on any of these ships coming out of Iranian ports?

Speaker 1:
[16:13] I absolutely think it does, and I share your assessment of that. It was a good example of professional mariner ship here. I mean, the ships, we hailed them, we warned them, we asked them to vacate the engine room, we disabled them, and then we boarded them. All very, very proper way of doing things, and all in accordance with the appropriate international law and everything else, I think, was done quite professionally. I think it's sent a very good message to others who might try to be running the blockade, and that they will be challenged, and that the military will back up what it's doing. So I don't want to minimize any of that. There's risk involved in all of that. But I think they performed extraordinarily well here, and I think it sends the right message that I think we were trying to send with the blockade.

Speaker 2:
[17:14] Well, let's talk about the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. I know you've probably been briefed in your career on this hundreds of times. But by most accounts, for its least, as long as I've been in the government, this, of course, has been sort of the radical element of the military to protect the regime, different from the regular army, if you will. And they've always been a significant part of the government structure, and you often hear, power behind the throne. And if there's anything I've heard of late, and I want to see whether you agree with this, it's that they've even gotten still more powerful since the death of the Supreme Leader. They seem to be in the ascendance right now. And as you referenced, the newspaper articles seem to be coming to the conclusion that there is a serious infighting in the regime about the approach. Do you think that's basically correct?

Speaker 1:
[18:13] I do. I think that's a very accurate assessment of this. I think the Iranian or the Islamic Republican Guard court leadership is ascending in this. I think we've seen examples of that, where we've seen kind of on the clerical side or on the political side making statements about opening the straits and then only to be countermanded very, very quickly by what I would assess to be the military side of this. Yeah, I definitely think they are ascending in this and they are exerting their authority. I think it's important to appreciate that we aren't necessarily beyond a generation of kind of the most revolutionary members of the IRGC. Their most senior folks are about my age, mid to late 60s and they were around in 79. They saw, they've been believers from the beginning. So, we are still, I think, a generation or two away from a fundamental shift away from that. So, these are true believers and I think they're going to continue to act that way.

Speaker 2:
[19:25] What's your sense? Let's assume this blockade of Iranian ports works and that President Trump keeps it going for another week to 10 days. I often hear experts say it's almost not even within the very nature of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to make substantive concessions, that the only reason they went along with the Obama deal some years ago was that none of the core interests of the regime were taken off the table. For example, uranium enrichment was allowed later down the road. Do you think they would just tough it out for months, despite these horrible economic conditions, just because compromise with the West seems so horrible to them?

Speaker 1:
[20:16] Well, I think we can look to history on this. I mean, they fought an eight-year war with Iraq, where they absorbed hundreds of thousands of casualties, and they endured that. So yeah, I think there is a high level of endurance capability to endure pain, to endure economic setbacks, and certainly with the regime. And again, as we talked about the last time we were on, was this is existential for the regime. So I don't think they particularly care about the people and about the normal Iranian citizen and about their suffering in terms of this. I think they only care about their survival in this. And so I think that's an important, they're going to continue to act in a way that is really focused on. There is no out for them. There's no alternative. There's no place they can go to. There's no safe place in Iran if they get set off to the side where they can survive. So it's very existential to them. And I do think they are going to continue to push back as hard as they can, and particularly when they think they have cards to play. And of course the biggest card they think they have right now or have right now is the Strait of Hormuz. They are going to continue to play that as much as they can.

Speaker 2:
[21:39] Yeah, it seems like their position now is we're not coming to Islamabad until you commit to take the blockade of Iranian ports off the table. And I think that's probably a ridge too far because one of the things we wanted was them to open the Straits. They say open the Straits, but it means to them apparently, call up the military and ask permission, tolls by crypto count, and take this route closest to the Iranian coast. So I think we've got some real definitional problems and a lot of demands are being made to even show up. Does that make sense?

Speaker 1:
[22:14] I think that's right. I think we're still, as we saw a couple of weeks ago in kind of these 10-point plans and in our corresponding whatever number of plan we had, these really I think represented maximalist kind of approaches on each side of this. I don't know that we've seen a whole lot of movement off of those since. And so this is, I guess, where the kind of the hard work of diplomacy comes in. And I know our desire is to have one big meeting, one big session that solves all the problems. I'm not sure that is how this is going to take place. I think when you look back at things like the JCPOA, I think that went up a year and a half or more for negotiations. And they're going to try to extract as much as they can out of this. So I think we have to figure out a much more layered approach, I think, to how we begin to move these maximalist approaches towards some areas of compromise here.

Speaker 2:
[23:17] Let's assume, well, first, let me ask about the communication strategy because that's a point that really resonates. It seems like the president has prioritized messaging the markets and maybe the American people on, we're almost done here, we're on our way out, we've won, they've made these concessions. But that doesn't seem like it's helped to convince the Iranians that the United States is in it for the long haul. It feels like it's a signal, and I can see them interpreting it this way, that President Trump is under pressure. He doesn't like his economic forecast, he's got a midterm election, etc. Then maybe they're hanging in there tougher than they ordinarily would because they think they have more time than we do. Is that fair?

Speaker 1:
[24:10] I think that's right, and I think they do have time on their side. As we just talked about, I think they're willing to suck it up here for as long as they need to, to try to extract something out of this. And I, you know, I, I, the president has a very unique way of communicating. I think we all appreciate that. And then, and how he does that. But in this situation, I mean, this is, we are, we are not dealing with a, with an unsavvy adversary here in the, in the information environment. And they are, they are giving as good as they are getting in terms of this. And so I think we, we need to be building a more international consensus around this. We need to, I think, be a little more careful and deliberate with our overall communication strategy to make sure that we have considered the effects of the things that we are, we are saying so we don't find ourselves getting walked back on some of these things or have all of a sudden tripping over our own red lines. When we, when we come up to them, I think it really begs for a much more deliberate, patient approach to strategic communications here with a, an adversary who's pretty savvy about all of this.

Speaker 2:
[25:24] Yeah, and it doesn't help if it looks like we're always rushing out the door. So I take your point on time, does it, you know, who, who seems to have more time seems absolutely relevant to who might compromise. So let's say the president said, General Votel, the blockade is working. I'm glad we're putting pressure on them, but I need more pressure on them. And this is in the service of diplomacy. I don't necessarily mean the resumption of kinetic activities. But if he says to you, let's put more pressure on the regime, is there what, what would you recommend? Is it the cargo island? Is it, is it the escort mission? What would you do if you had to send a memo to the president?

Speaker 1:
[26:13] Yeah, I mean, well, I think there's a lot of things here. And again, all of these things, I think have ramifications. One of the things we haven't really talked about, and we really talked about the Houthis and what they might do with this. I mean, they kind of have done a little little bit here, but that dog is largely not barked in this thing so far. So we have to think about some of the ramifications of the things we're doing. I mean, I think the idea of trying to perhaps loosen, some of the ships that are kind of bottled up in the in the Gulf and helping get some of those out through a more southerly approach that either we escort or we picket or we do something to, you know, to improve the level of confidence and people's ability to move through there that they one won't hit mines and second of all, they won't be interdicted by by Iranian missiles and drones, I think would be would be a good, I think a good thing to do to kind of get, you know, relieve some of the pressure in there. And then the Gulf, I think would be good. You know, going to something like Karg Island, I mean, that's, I think always on the table. We could certainly do that. I, that would give us control over a major export location. Although I think we have pretty good control over that right now with kind of the blockade. They're not really able to do much more out of that without us having to accept the risk of that. I mean, there may be some kinetic targeting we can do that might be of some value in putting more pressure on and I'm struggling to think of what that might be right now at this particular point. I'm not as obviously as up to speed on it as our current military leadership would be, but there may be some of that. So I think the main thing would be trying to maybe relieve some of the pressure inside the Gulf. Yeah.

Speaker 2:
[28:21] We're going to take a quick break and we'll be right back with more of our discussion with General Joe Votel.

Speaker 3:
[28:27] Beacon Global Strategies is the premier national security advisory firm. Beacon works side by side with leading companies to help them understand national security policy, geopolitical risk, global technology policy and federal procurement trends. Beacon's insight gives business leaders the decision advantage. Founded in 2013, Beacon develops and supports the execution of bespoke strategies to mitigate business risk, drive growth and navigate a complex geopolitical environment. With a bipartisan team and decades of experience, Beacon provides a global perspective to help clients tackle their toughest challenges.

Speaker 2:
[29:06] How do you quantify or how do you explain to maybe a policy maker how risky an escort mission or a picket would be? Do you think Iran would target a US naval ship with the drone? Do you think that, no, they wouldn't do that, but they would try to target more commercial vessels or they might take another shot at the UAE's, anything in the UAE. That seems to be their favorite target. I always hear it's very risky, but tell me, unpack that.

Speaker 1:
[29:42] My experience, just my own, especially in the kind of the CT fight was that, I think what really works with civilian leaders is taking the time to use the word educate. I don't mean that in a negative or pejorative way here. I mean, just to make them understand what this operation looks like. What does it look like on the ground or on the sea? Then very carefully taking them through all the risks that are associated with that. I think that's really, really, really, really critical. Then as identifying those risks, then talking about the ways that the military is trying to mitigate those risks. So we can get them to a level where we're at a moderate or some level of risk that can be acceptable to not only a military commander, but more importantly to a civilian decision maker that's going to make that. So I mean, I think that's the way you do it. I don't know if there's anything particularly magic about it, but you know, this is the value of a process, frankly, of a national security process. If we're considering these things, it would bubble up. There would be some meetings, discussions on this, so that by the time it got up to a higher level, a lot of issues will have been resolved or identified, and maybe some options removed and some refined. So by the time you get up to the Secretary of Defense or the President of the United States, you've got some refined options that you can lay out for him, and that not only shows how we're going to do it, but then makes him very aware of what the risk is that he is accepting in terms of doing this. I mean, I think that's just the way it's got to be.

Speaker 2:
[31:32] Yeah, yes, sir. I want to move over to the HEU in just a few minutes here, but can you sort of help explain? First, there's this question out there of, well, why weren't we more prepared for this Iranian Strait of Hormuz contingency? And I've sort of argued without knowing for sure, but understanding the military and reading a lot, that of course the military briefed the White House on this and briefed the president on this. This is something we've been talking about for 50 years. It's been in every study and article, not to mention intelligence piece. First of all, you'd endorse that, wouldn't you?

Speaker 1:
[32:16] Oh yeah, the threat that Iran would pose against Strait of Hormuz was a very well-known risk going into this. So we've recognized that for a long time.

Speaker 2:
[32:29] So I guess we have to just conclude and maybe the Wall Street Journal's article that says the president didn't thought the Iranians would have capitulated before they moved to the Strait. I mean, in the absence of any other information, I guess I'm going to conclude that that rings true to me.

Speaker 1:
[32:51] Well, you know, Michael, you know, I don't know if we talked about this in our last episode here, but you know, the president is a very instinctual decision maker, I think, and, you know, I think that's reflected in the national security decision process that we have here right now. With that, I think he is very influenced by his own experience. So we think back to something like Venezuela and how that went, and the confidence he had in the military and the way that they kind of performed in accordance with all of those expectations, I think, is probably something that informed him. And I think it's important to also appreciate that there, you know, in addition to the US national security enterprise informing this, we also had the Israelis informing some of these decisions early on. I think he probably perhaps put a lot of stock in what was coming from the Israeli side in terms of this. And, you know, that's might those might have been influential factors in his decision making.

Speaker 2:
[33:49] Yeah, that's fair point. He could have thought that maybe the regime change people might have poked their head out. And maybe we were thinking about doing the Kurds options at some point before that was taken off the table.

Speaker 1:
[34:03] Or that, you know, that an overwhelming strike is as we did execute here, and it took out leadership and attacked a lot of things simultaneously and put a lot of pressure over a number of days would lead to a capitulation before we even got to something like the Straits of Hormuz. I think might have been one of the assessments that were made.

Speaker 2:
[34:25] So here's what I'm driving at. People say, well, I can't believe we in the United States weren't prepared for this contingency. And I wonder, and I'm not blaming the military, of course, it's the policymakers at the end of the day, but is there more that we could have done? We talked last time about how it hurt from others, admirals in particular, that we had to do the attack mission to degrade the ballistic missiles. We had to do it for the drones. And only then could we start focusing on the strait. But could we have done more? Should we have stationed several destroyers all across that route? So if they said, we're going to threaten the straits, it would have been, we would have in a sense negated it. I mean, did we make a mistake?

Speaker 1:
[35:14] I don't know that we made a mistake. I think we made a choice about how we were going to conduct this operation. And, you know, when the decision to bring warships to the Straits of Hormuz and to the Gulf of, you know, the Arabian Gulf there, it was always, it is always a significant one. It's become more significant over time, particularly as Iran has developed advanced capabilities. You know, there was a time when we used to pull carriers up into the Gulf and operate them. You know, think about Desert Storm, think about some of these other things. We pulled the carriers up into that area and operated carriers from inside the Gulf. We don't generally do that now. And I think that is a recognition of, you know, the capabilities that our principal adversary, Iran, has in terms of that. Now, could we have perhaps done that? Yeah, we could have. But again, we would have had to make sure we, you know, we understood the risks and then we took measures to mitigate that. And I would suspect that what, you know, the decision that comes out of that is the potential gain of putting ships into the Gulf or picking them across didn't outweigh the risk. And it may be adversely impacted on our ability to orchestrate the campaign that was approved by our civilian leaders to go after Iran. So, yeah, I mean, there can be, I think there can be a lot of discussion about all of this, but I certainly can appreciate the decisions and choices that were made and why they were made in this particular situation.

Speaker 2:
[36:57] Yeah, understood. Well, last time we had a terrific conversation on the 440 kilograms of 60 percent highly enriched uranium and experts have noted, well, there's more than that. There's a lot of 20 percent enriched uranium as well. And we talked about a military raid on the site and what that might entail. It seems like that idea has been taken off the table because it would, you know, be risky and escalatory and who knows what else. Have you heard anything on this in particular or maybe read anything in the last few weeks on how we ought to see this option and whether it's even practical or just too risky?

Speaker 1:
[37:47] I think the consensus that I'm seeing on this now, listening to people that are, others that are talking about this and thinking through, I mean, I think the consensus is that the retrieval of this material, this highly enriched material on whatever grades that it is, is something that is probably most effectively done as kind of a post agreement activity. And again, that's one of the kind of the sticking points here in the current negotiation process is what is the disposition of that material and how do we get it out of there? I mean, I think the best way of getting this is supporting the IAEA who comes in and supervises this and we come in as a supporting military force or maybe somebody else does and grabs the stuff and moves it to some safe location. I mean, I think that would be the best of all worlds. And I think that's what the consensus is kind of moving towards here in terms of what's the best way to get control of this. And I think the other consensus point is that there needs to be control of this material. That, you know, leaving it here, leaving it in Iran may not be the best option on this. So I think that puts a little bit more pressure on some type of longer term solution, maybe post agreement here on the disposition of those materials.

Speaker 2:
[39:15] As we begin to wrap up here, let me just ask you a little bit about Israel. And where do you think they are in all of this? It seems like the president pulled a fast one on the prime minister by announcing that Israel had agreed to a Hezbollah ceasefire before they had decided they would, or at least they had not talked to their own cabinet about it yet. But it feels like Bibi Netanyahu has to make sure there's no daylight between him and President Trump. What's your sense of decades of talking to them? Are they itching to get back into the fight? What do you think is going on there?

Speaker 1:
[39:59] I think they are very focused on trying to address this problem for a final time. I think that's really been their orientation. I think it's important to appreciate that for the Israelis, this is existential. They certainly view it as existential because they are within range of Iran. They have been attacked by Iran in their homeland. They have to deal with all these proxies around them. I think there is a little bit of a fundamental difference at the strategic level between how we look at the situation, how the United States looks at the situation, and how Israel looks at the situation. I think we view that we would like some type of government in place that's compliant, that would be more attuned to maybe integrating back into the community of nations in the region here, and being a more positive contributor to this. I don't know that Israel really shares that. I don't know that they are particularly concerned if there's any effective government left in Iran. I think they are very much focused on doing as much damage and destruction as possible against this regime, for which has been kind of been the bane of their existence for a long time. So I think there are some fundamental differences at the strategic level. I think that's why it's really important to kind of diplomacy track and only kind of keep coming back to that. But that's got to kind of be knit together as well. And as this goes on, I think you're going to begin to see these pressures being put on our president about how we're wrapping this up, how we're going to get the markets back moving in the right direction, stuff like that. Those are not necessarily Israel's concerns. They are our concerns. And those are fundamental differences here that are going to have to be addressed and have to be resolved as we move forward in this. So I don't think there's certainly no rupture. I think we're still very much in alignment. Certainly militarily we are. But fundamentally, I think at the very highest strategic level, there are some gaps there that need to be sewn together, I think.

Speaker 2:
[42:18] Last question. Just, you know, I won't hold you to it, but where do you think we're headed? I mean, what do you think the next few weeks are going to look like?

Speaker 1:
[42:28] I mean, I think what we're looking at right now is what we're going to see in the next few weeks. And that is this continued posturing here diplomatically, why we try to work through this, whether it's through Pakistan or other interlocutors that are trying to begin to knit together a framework around which discussions can be made. I think we'll continue to see some of these activities in the Strait of Hormuz, whether it's us stopping ships and maybe disabling them if they try to run through this. And I ran exercising their control if they have to, just as they apparently did today in seizing a couple of ships. I think we're going to continue to see that. I'm also kind of paying attention to what's happened in Lebanon. We're about six days into a 10-day truce there, and that's going to come to an end or it's going to be extended. And what happens there has an impact over here. It definitely has an impact over here. Iran has definitely linked these things together. So we should be paying very, very close attention to that as well. There is a third carrier, third US carrier moving into the region. Whether we keep all three or whether we replace one with the other, I think will be a little bit of an indication of what our posture looks like going forward here. So that's definitely something worth paying attention to. But I think what we're seeing right now is probably what we're going to see for the next week or so.

Speaker 2:
[43:58] Yeah. It feels like there's going to be a lot of posturing and maneuvering to see if we can get back for a second round in Islamabad. General Joe Votel, that was terrific. Thank you so much for being on NatSec Matters.

Speaker 1:
[44:14] Thanks, Michael. Great to be with you again.

Speaker 2:
[44:18] That was General Joe Votel. I'm Michael Allen. Please join us next week for another episode of NatSec Matters.

Speaker 3:
[44:28] NatSec Matters is produced by Steve Dorsey with assistance from Ashley Berry. NatSec Matters is a production of Beacon Global Strategies.