transcript

Speaker 1:
[00:00] Where do the negotiations with Iran stand? What can a deal actually look like? And does diplomacy still have a chance?

Speaker 2:
[00:07] I personally believe we will get an agreement.

Speaker 1:
[00:09] I think there's going to be an agreement forthcoming of one kind or another. I think the world needs that. I think we desperately need to calm things down. I'm Jake Sullivan. And I'm Jon Finer.

Speaker 3:
[00:20] And we're the hosts of The Long Game, a weekly national security podcast.

Speaker 4:
[00:23] This week, former Secretary of State John Kerry joins us on the pod.

Speaker 1:
[00:27] The episode's out now. Search for and follow The Long Game, wherever you get your podcasts.

Speaker 4:
[00:36] Burnout at work is a tale as old as time.

Speaker 5:
[00:39] Tale as old as time.

Speaker 4:
[00:41] But a new generation may have found the fix.

Speaker 2:
[00:44] We can learn so much from Gen Z and what they are teaching us about modeling the boundaries that would have prevented all of us from burning out in the first place.

Speaker 6:
[00:57] How to win the battle against burnout.

Speaker 4:
[00:59] That's this week on Explain It To Me.

Speaker 6:
[01:01] Find new episodes Sundays wherever you get your podcasts.

Speaker 7:
[01:06] Of course, there was always going to be fragmentation in a second term of a presidency because whoever is the uniting figure is no longer going to be the uniting figure three years from now. And so people inside that broader kind of movement start to look at, OK, who's the next guy? What is the next thing that's going to happen? And in the Republican Party, where there's pretty significant debate between a wide variety of wings and a lot of these matters, that is breaking out into the open. I don't find any of that particularly shocking. The only thing that I do find shocking is some of the sort of conspiratorial nonsense that has been promoted by some of these major influencers.

Speaker 8:
[01:43] Welcome to Raging Moderates. I'm Scott Galloway.

Speaker 9:
[01:45] And I'm Jessica Tarlov.

Speaker 8:
[01:46] Today, we're joined by one of the most influential voices. I want to say on the right, I'll just say one of the most influential voices. Also, I'm just an enormous fan of Ben. And we were just saying off mic, it's weird we haven't met before. And really, I hate the land acknowledgement of saying, I don't always agree with him, but I don't. But I appreciate the moral clarity and just the reasoning. And literally the last person I would ever want to see on the other side of the stage in a debate. He's been a forceful defender of the Iran war, calling it the single bravest foreign policy move of his lifetime. And even as the ceasefire hangs in the balance, visible fractures begin to emerge within the MAGA coalition. We thought the best guest to have here would be, of course, Ben Shapiro, host of the Ben Shapiro Show and co-founder of The Daily Wire. Ben, it really is a real pleasure to have you. Thanks for being here.

Speaker 7:
[02:37] Now, Scott and Jessica, I really appreciate you having me. It's very kind of you. And of course, I've listened to your show for a long time as well.

Speaker 8:
[02:41] So if you aren't already, please make sure to subscribe to our YouTube page to stay in the loop on all news politics. So let's get into the news of the day and then we'll zoom out and talk a little bit about the state of affairs in DC and between the parties. We're just hours before the ceasefire deadline and the US and Iranian officials both sending mixed signals, naval confrontations escalating in the Strait of Hormuz and peace talks hanging on by a thread. The question now isn't just how this ends, but is the conflict already reshaping American power, the Republican Party, MAGA and the broader global order? Just yesterday, dozens of veterans were arrested for protesting the war at the Capitol. You've called this war a defining act of strength. I'm curious, give us your sense of the state of play here and drill down as deep as you want or pull back as far as you want, but sort of Iran question mark your thoughts.

Speaker 7:
[03:36] Sure. I mean, it's obviously very difficult to summarize where we are in terms of this moment because we don't know. I don't know. I'm not sure anybody knows outside the president of the United States and the Iranians on the other side of the table. So sort of operating through a glass half-darkly here, it's difficult to sort of foresee what's going to happen next. The reason that I think that this is a defining act of clarity and moral action on behalf of the administration is that the Iranian Islamic Republic has been a thorn in the side of the West since its establishment in 1979. It is responsible for the death of hundreds, if not thousands of American citizens. It has spread its terrorist tentacles all over the region. It has indeed spread its terror tentacles beyond the region. It was building up a nuclear weapons cache. It was also building up a massive ballistic missile arsenal that was capable of generating an umbrella that would have protected the incipient nuclear program from some sort of defenestration by the United States or by Israel or by any other Gulf allies. So for the president to essentially say to the Iranians that no longer will you be able to call America's bluff on this and have sweet talk us into a North Korean style slide into an armed nuclear state that is now immovable with significantly more reach abroad than North Korea does. We don't think too much about North Korea these days because unless North Korea is exploding a bomb in an attempt to sort of leverage the world into paying it money, they don't seem to pose too much of an external threat, maybe to South Korea, but not much beyond that. Iran is a very different story. Iran has created chaos in the region all the way across from Iraq, through Syria, into Lebanon, down south toward Yemen, via Saudi Arabia. They have created chaos. They have bases in South America. Iran has much more external aspiration than the North Koreans ever did. You arm that regime with a nuclear weapon, and suddenly the possibility of true global conflict gets extremely, extremely severe. And so the president saying that he does not trust that future presidents are going to take the threat seriously. I think he is correct in that, and the move along with the Israelis to go after Iran's defenses to take out their air force, to take out their Navy, to seriously damage their ballistic missile capacity, and to do it while the Iranian economy was basically on its last footing. I think it was a unique target of opportunity. And again, I think the way that I'm explaining it is a bit different from the way that the president has explained it. I think there are probably reasons for that that we can discuss. But I think that there are a few sort of preconditions that the American people tend to think of with regard to war, that I tend to think are wrong. But unfortunately, I think that the war tends to be explained in those terms, and that leads to some confusion. So for example, when the president says they were an imminent threat, people tend to think imminent threat means that a plane was about to fly into a building in New York City. The more accurate term here would have been preemptive war. But of course, we're not allowed to talk about preemptive war in the aftermath of Iraq. The same thing is true with regard to regime change. This is not technically a regime change war, but it is a slow rolling regime change war in the sense that the damage done to the Iranian economy does put that regime in significantly more deteriorating position than they were before the war. They were in serious trouble before the war. And the president doesn't want to talk about regime change because that would necessitate certain activity because of the attempt to deliver on that would then require activity he doesn't want to do like boots on the ground. So again, I think that what's actually happening and the disconnect between that and what is rhetorically being sold is pretty severe. And I can understand why people's heads are spinning along those axes, but the notion that Iran is somehow strengthened after its entire upper echelon has been destroyed, after its air force is non-existent, after its Navy is essentially non-existent, and after it's been forced, I think it's an act of weakness to shut down the Strait of Hormuz, which cannot and will not, I think, last for very much longer. If that's what it's been relegated to and its terror arms have been defenestrated in places like Lebanon and places like Syria, this is a much weakened Iran regime. And in that aspect, I think the president has done something truly incredible here.

Speaker 8:
[07:34] So I think there's a lot of merit in the arguments that this is a unique moment in time and opportunity. Their defense is totally destroyed. The IRGC seem to be wobbling. The idea of further diminishing their ability to fund terror through their proxies across the region, taking out their Navy, diminishing their missile infrastructure, all of these things, check, check, check. How would you respond to the notion that this entire conflict or war demonstrates or defines operational excellence but strategic incompetence? To not anticipate the Strait of Hormuz being seized by the Iranians, to not have a plan for getting ex-pats out of the region, for not anticipating that these military bases would become a target. I think more missiles have been fired into the UAE than into Israel. I think it's hard to argue that Iran isn't weakened. I worry that the reputation of the US has been weakened because this has been so, the operation itself at a strategic level has been so mishandled. Your thoughts?

Speaker 7:
[08:35] So, I kind of object to the idea that the operation itself has been deeply mishandled. I think we're not going to know the answer to that until after the war is over because obviously the outcome of war is what determines whether we thought it was well thought. I think if you had stopped World War II in 1942, you would have thought, okay, things were going really, really poorly. So the outcome of a war determines whether or not the American people like it and whether the world takes away from it a particular message, and that's true of every war. And so it's hard to sort of forecast what the eventual impact will be until we get to the end point. The notion that the Strait of Hormuz was unforeseen, I find it hard to believe that no one in the Pentagon foresaw the possibility of the Iranians firing drones at large scale tankers that don't move very fast through a very narrow choke point. My guess is that the United States military probably thought that that was a counterproductive move for the Iranians to take. That if they did that, they would eventually end up cutting off their nose to spite their face and destroying their own capacity to import and export, the only thing keeping their economy alive because they don't have the ability to export oil to the East. And in fact, that is what's happened. And I think that what President Trump did here in sort of reverse blockading the Iranian ships, the weirdness at the beginning of the war is that the United States was allowing Iran to ship in and out oil in order to keep the oil prices down. That was the strategic incompetence to me, if anything. It seems to me that if we had from the very beginning said Iran is not getting a thing in and it's not getting a thing out, and they are going to abide by the same rules that they have dictated to everybody else, the most damaging thing the United States has done to Iran at this point is probably not even the military barrage that has been unleashed on Iran or even the killing of its leadership. What's happening right now in preventing Iran from exporting something $400 million worth of oil every single day is devastating to the regime, a regime that was already on its last legs economically. The real is trading at zero right now. They literally do not have a currency that is worth, it's not even close to worth its paper. It's not worth a ton of paper at this point. Again, I think that if there was anything that was unforeseen here, I think the only thing that was unforeseen and I think it should have been foreseen. If the question is, what is the mistake here? I think that the mistake is the belief that a rational actor would emerge on the other side to take the Venezuelan position. I think that that may have been a misread. But I don't think that that's a misread of the Strait of Hormuz as much as it is a misread of the intent of the Ayatollahs, which is to retain power at any cost, up to and including the slaughter of vast numbers of its own citizens, the complete starvation of its population, and the belief that as long as they just outlast, that they will win. This is the weirdness of the modern era, is that you never will get a surrender on paper from anyone ever again. So if the rule is the only way that the West wins is if the other side cries uncle, it's not possible for the West to win a war probably ever again.

Speaker 8:
[11:14] It strikes me that one of the examples of how this could have been better handled is if we had at least briefed Congress. We, the administration had briefed Congress, perhaps even enlisted a couple of European allies who have a vested interest in the free flow of navigation, and at least from a perception standpoint, been more tightly integrated or coordinated with our Gulf allies. It feels like we are a bit sequestered on the global stage and being seen acting unilaterally and somewhat recklessly. Do you see any merit to the notion that we would have really benefited, having at least attempted to enlist or include some of our allies in the Gulf and in Europe and at least briefed Congress?

Speaker 7:
[11:53] I find that hard to support just empirically, meaning that George W. Bush, for example, in 2003 had a very large coalition of the willing. That amounted to precisely zero points in favor of public action beyond the point where the insurgency began. So I think that again, the outcomes of wars tend to tell whether we think they were good or bad. Also, the Europeans have shown themselves to be utterly feckless on this particular matter. I mean, I'm kind of astonished at the fecklessness of the Europeans, to be frank with you. I, who have been a strong, thoroughgoing supporter of funding for Ukraine, I continue to support American funding for Ukraine resisting Russian aggression. It's certainly made me think a little bit differently about the European countries who have been caterwalling at us about this, given the fact that, again, this rate of homos impacts their commerce significantly more than it impacts our commerce, and yet they have been unwilling to do anything other than stand on the sidelines and scream about how terrible the United States is. So, as far as informing Congress, I think that the level of distrust, this goes to sort of some systemic issues in the United States more broadly, the level of distrust that currently exists between the political parties makes it very difficult to do basic functions. And I think this is one of those areas where you can see that happening. I think that the Trump administration, justifiably or unjustifiably, probably believe that if they had actually gone and briefed Congress, that there was a good shot that that would have been in the New York Times the next day.

Speaker 8:
[13:15] To be fair, just around the notion of factless, with respect to Ukraine and you and I share a viewpoint on Ukraine, I would argue the Europeans have stepped up while Americans have cut and run.

Speaker 7:
[13:24] So, I agree with the Europeans on Ukraine. I disagree with the Europeans that they should tell us that we need to put a gigantic bill for Ukraine, which again, I'm fine with. While at the same time saying, how dare you do this thing that, I mean, if you're going to negotiate, the bottom line in any negotiation has to be the possibility of an iron fist under the velvet glove. If the iron fist never exists, then the velvet glove means nothing.

Speaker 9:
[13:45] Yeah. So, you've said a few things that I wanted to touch on. You said, if the West is ever going to win a war again, and this loops into what you were just talking about with Scott, the West as a block does not function anymore. Various pieces of it decide which war they're into and which they are in. If it's a surgical strike, we're all for it. If it's not, maybe we're going to be against it. You have your dependent on oil from bad actors and very slow rolling getting off of that dependency, which is underpinning a lot of what we're seeing now. It feels increasingly like we are alone in this plus Israel. I wanted you, if you could, to define where you think our interests are versus Israel's, where they're aligned and where they aren't, and what you make of all the reporting surrounding how we did end up deciding to go and do this. You know, the New York Times reporting on Bibi Netanyahu being in the situation room and making the pitch. And we know from people who have worked in past administrations that Netanyahu has tried to convince at least President Obama and Biden to do this. And according to the reporting, they just never took the bait on it. They did not think that the quote unquote imminent threat was enough to be able to do this and Iran has been a few weeks away from a nuclear bomb since we've been hearing from Netanyahu. So could you talk a little bit more about where you think our interests are and Israel's and how that impacts our ally relationships?

Speaker 7:
[15:15] Well, sure. I mean, I think that our allies are constantly pitching us on things that they would like us to do. And sometimes we say yes and sometimes we say no. Ukraine obviously would be a good case in point of an ally that's been pitching us for a very long time. Sometimes we say yes, sometimes we say no. I prefer that we say yes more often with regard to Ukraine. And there has been a divergence of interest. There's always an aversions of interest, unless you're calling for unconditional surrender of a country.

Speaker 9:
[15:37] I think we tried that the first time. When Trump came out and he said, it's going to be 24 hours and it's unconditional surrender.

Speaker 7:
[15:42] Right, exactly. But again, I filed that alongside some of his other tweets that overstate I think the extent to which the tweet is reflective of the policy. But if you're talking about the fact that allies in the United States don't necessarily have the same end game, I think that's been true in pretty much every conflict actually. I'm sure that when we were working with the South Koreans against the North Koreans, the idea was not going to be that we leave the North Koreans in power north of the parallel. And I think that's been true in pretty much every conflict. So the idea that the Israelis were lobbying for the United States to get involved, I don't find that particularly surprising considering, of course, it would be better for Israel for us to get involved. That doesn't mean it would be worse for the United States if we were to get involved. That's sort of the case that I'm making here. It seems that it would be worse for the United States to let a target of opportunity pass us by. And then two years from now, Iran not only has a nuclear weapon, Iran also is re-strengthening its terror proxies in the region and launching action against not just Israel, but all of our Gulf allies. I mean, whenever we talk about it's US and Israel, we should note here that Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain are all on the side of the United States and Israel, which is sort of a historic thing. I mean, I'm old enough barely to remember that in the Gulf War, it was the United States telling Israel not to get involved in the Gulf War and fire back against Iraq when they were being hit with Scud missiles simply to avoid alienating our Gulf allies. So the fact that you have everybody on the same page actually is kind of a new form of alliance and sort of shocking in many ways. As far as, again, the divergences of interests, listen, I'm sure that the Israelis would love it if the United States were to drop 20,000 troops into Tehran today and try to take down the regime directly. I don't think that that's in President Trump's interests. I don't think that's in the United States' interests. I've said that repeatedly. And so the sort of gap in means and methodologies and interests very much exist. By the way, there's a gap with regard to the Strait of Hormuz on the other side. So to just take a quick example, it doesn't matter 0% to Israel whether the Strait of Hormuz is open. Israel is not going to toil from the Strait of Hormuz. It's very much in the United States' interest to open the Strait of Hormuz. Is that gap in sort of end game somehow indicative of a lack of alliance? I think not. So the notion, I do object to the notion, because the president has said it over and over and over, that Israel somehow wheedled him into this. The president, it turns out, is very capable of not being wheedled. It's pretty much anything he wants to do. And the president is even capable of cramming down deals on the Israelis on the Israelis they don't particularly like. That's happened multiple times over the past couple of years. It recently happened, for example, I think, to a certain extent with this Lebanon ceasefire, which I think the president really pushed for in a way the Israelis were not particularly happy with. I think the same thing happened at the end of the 12-day war when actually the final missile that was fired was an Iranian missile. It hit Israel. Israel had planes in the air to retaliate, and the president told the Israelis to stand down.

Speaker 9:
[18:16] Yeah, that's definitely true. You saw a change in attitude from the president towards the Israelis probably starting four or five days ago, where he basically said like, you stop it, and I'm going to do what I want to do, and you have to play by our rules. But that was a market shift from the first five, six weeks of the conflict.

Speaker 7:
[18:33] Again, I'm not sure that that's the case in the sense that I think that the Israelis knew from the very beginning that the president is a volatile person with regard to decision-making, and so sometimes interest would align, and sometimes interest would not align. So I think that's been gained into the system.

Speaker 9:
[18:47] But there's a clear palpable frustration on the part of the president with how this is going. Whether it was something that he concocted in his own mind, or that he was told by Bibi Netanyahu or Pete Hegseth, who was very enthusiastic about this conflict, and it sounds like there were high-ranking officials like General Kaine, who were more concerned about things like the Strait of Hormuz, and that this might require boot on the ground, that there has been a shift because he's facing a world in which he has a 37 percent approval rating, the gas is over $4, there's predictions like Kalshi has a blue tsunami coming for the midterms, and that's because people here at home overwhelmingly don't approve of this conflict. They're paying more for it, and no one has bothered to ask them whether they wanted to get into it in the first place.

Speaker 7:
[19:34] So a few things to say here. One, one of the reasons that I say that what the president is doing is an act of political bravery is because bravery requires risk. If you do a thing because the polls say it's popular, that is not particularly brave. The president doing a thing that needs to be done in spite of the polls not being particularly good seems to be far braver than if you were to do the thing and the polls were to be mind-bogglingly excellent. So there's that. As far as the blue wave that is to come, again, I think that this is an off-year election. The president was relatively unpopular before the Iran action. It was pretty well in play that the Republicans were probably going to lose the House, and they probably weren't going to do particularly well in the Senate while still holding the Senate. I noticed that the date is currently the middle of April. We are about 1,000 news cycles from the election. I do not think this war is going to be ongoing by the time we hit late summer, which is when people really start to pay attention for the midterms. So I think that anybody who is sticking their finger in the wind about whether to pursue a conflict that ends with the defenestration, we would hope, of a true threat to the United States, with an eye on an election that is multiple months away based on polls today, I think that would be a misapplication of political acumen. As far as the sort of his frustration. Listen, the president is frustrated if things don't happen immediately. But his frustration seems to be far more if you take a look at his social. His frustration is far more with people who seem to be ignoring the great military successes of the war. The fact that people are mirroring Iranian propaganda is though Iran is somehow winning the war, which again, there is no stretch by which you can make the case that Iran is winning the war. Unless your standard is Iran is still there, the government of Iran is still there, which again, as I say, that's a pretty high bar. There is no standard by which Iran is winning. And so I think the president, you can see, is quite frustrated with the idea that he's doing a thing that other presidents have promised, which is to get rid of the Iranian nuclear program, to prevent their funding of terrorism abroad and spreading their terror tentacles and their continued threat to, again, not just Israel but Gulf allies in the region. And he's very, very frustrated with it. I'd say he's more frustrated with that and with people on what I've called the grievance party right, or undermining him from inside the Republican Party, than he is frustrated with, quote, unquote, how the war is going. Listen, would he love for the Iranians to come to the table and give up the ghost? Sure. But I think that the notion that he is deeply frustrated with either Israel or the military, or that the war itself, he wishes he could go back in reverse time. I see no evidence of that.

Speaker 8:
[21:53] Do you worry that we're going to see a further erosion in support for Israel? Because I believe the Trump administration did not handle the narrative well, and let this perception that the tail was wagging the dog with respect to the comments you made earlier, that Israel somehow had bullied the president into the war. Are you worried as I am that Israel is going to lose even more support in the US as the perception is we've been dragged into this war by Israel?

Speaker 7:
[22:20] Obviously, the numbers are what the numbers are, and to notice that the numbers on Israel for Americans have been going the wrong way for a while would be to ignore the reality. I will say that if the bargain is that, if speak as an advocate for the pro-Israel position, from my position, if Israel is safer and the United States is safer and the poll numbers are worse for the foreseeable future, then that is a deal that is well worth making. To me, it seems that the slide in support for Israel did not begin with this current war in order to begin with this 12-day war. The slide for support in Israel became almost immediate with October 7th. If the notion is that the only way that the pro-Israel position is somehow popular is if Israel simply accepts having the hell beat out of it and suffering threats on multiple fronts or fighting a fantasy war that is completely antiseptic and free of casualty, then I'm not sure that that's living in a world of reality either. I would prefer, this is true for the United States, it's true for Israel, it's true for all of our allies. I prefer victory in unpopularity to defeat in popularity.

Speaker 8:
[23:25] Well, you are just pulling the aperture back more broadly with respect to Trump, but just how Trump approaches foreign policy. What you would describe as bravery and leadership, I'm empathetic to, but I see that it's sometimes arrogance and recklessness. And that is, I see us since 1945 as having alliances with and largely setting the tone of being the operating system for about two-thirds of the West's GDP. They're loosely speaking, Europe and South Korea and Japan might hum and ha, but they basically joined us even reluctantly arm and arm in most major conflicts. We, freedom of navigation, our rules, dollar-denominated currency. And I would argue that the president has essentially gone from a majority-controlled position geopolitically to a minority-controlled position. And it's said to the one-third that we used to be allies with, you have to find your own way. You have to pay for your own security, which I agree with, but has unnecessarily alienated them, whether it's talks of invading Greenland, whether it's sclerotic tariff policy. What would you say to the notion that the president has gone from a majority position and sort of, without any upside, alienated and created sort of a third leg of the stool that used to be kind of arm-in-arm with us?

Speaker 7:
[24:40] So I think that that's true to the extent that we're talking about Greenland and Canada and tariff policy. I opposed his tariff policies because I thought they were blunderbuss and I thought that they were not targeted in any specific way and it was unclear what the purpose of them was other than what seemed to me to be a misapprehension about how economics works, frankly, that we become richer when we tariff other countries just by necessity, which is not the way that it works. I agree that, listen, I think that Pierre Pilié would probably be the Prime Minister of Canada right now if the president had not decided to launch a tariff war on Canada. And I think that attempting to make a case for invading Greenland is not exactly designed to win friends and admirers in Europe, nor is JD Vance's speech in Europe designed to win friends and admirers in Europe. As opposed to, by the way, the Secretary of State's speech, Marco Rubio, who actually I thought gave a pretty excellent speech in Europe. So I agree from a sort of rhetorical level and on some of those policies. When it comes to what I think, again, are true threats to America and our interests abroad, there we have to pursue our interests and allies, if they were good allies, would help us out in the same way that we've helped out Europe with regard to Ukraine. And as I say, should have been helping Europe more with regard to Ukraine. I will say that I think there are two sides to this particular story. The fact that the response by Europe has been, in some cases, to try to make overtures to the Chinese. I think it's foolish of us to alienate the Europeans such that they make overtures to the Chinese. I think it's even more foolish of the Europeans to, in short-term thinking, fashion, try to make overtures to the Chinese. I think the same thing is true of the Canadians. The Canadians, instead of looking three years down the road and thinking, okay, policy is very likely to change, trying to reorient toward sort of friendliness with China, seems to be a bizarre move at best and a counterproductive move for the West. What I would say is, I don't like a lot of the policies you're talking about, and also it takes two to tango, and I would prefer that both sides stop tangoing on separate lines on these particular matters.

Speaker 8:
[26:27] Would you describe the US as a good ally right now?

Speaker 7:
[26:30] I think that the US has always been a bit of an unreliable ally, shall we say. I think that the United States, since probably the end of the Cold War, has been at best an intermittently decent ally. We've taken a very vague view with regard to Taiwan, for example. The Kurds might have something to say about the nature of our alliances with them in the past. Hong Kong might have something to say about this. The reality is that I don't think it's unique to President Trump. I would say that it depends which allies you're talking about. I don't think that the Brits were particularly taken, some members of the British government, you might say, when Barack Obama removed the statue of Churchill from the Oval Office, that wouldn't exactly be a wonderful sort of overture to the Brits. The same thing is true, I can tell you the Israelis would not be particularly happy with Barack Obama as an ally. The Saudis were not happy with Joe Biden as an ally. So I think it depends which allies you're talking about when. But yes, I wish that the United States had a more constant and durable foreign policy that made us a more reliable ally. I think if we did that, then we'd have a lot more friends in the world.

Speaker 8:
[27:35] So Anne, hold on, you're a smart guy. You don't think that this is a little bit different? That we're unnecessarily alienating who have been wonderful allies for us?

Speaker 7:
[27:44] Oh no, I do. I mean, I just said that I think that the tariffs and Greenland policy and Canada policy is unnecessarily alienating. I'm just pointing out that if we're going to talk about unnecessary alienating, the Biden administration coming in and making its chief focus, Jamal Khashoggi, and the dereliction of the Saudi government, and alienating the Saudis to the extent that the Iranians saw an opening was a huge mistake. And so again, this is not both sides. Because I think both sides are bad. Both sides is where I say that it's OK for my side to do it, as long as your side also did it. I don't think either side should be doing that.

Speaker 9:
[28:12] We all agree that the Abraham Accords were an enormous achievement. But standing up for human rights, I think, was something that was a bit of a bright spot in the Biden administration.

Speaker 7:
[28:22] To be fair, Joe Biden stood up for human rights until precisely the point he needed the oil prices to come down for the midterm elections, at which point he traveled to Saudi Arabia and kowtowed to the Saudi royal government.

Speaker 9:
[28:32] I don't think there were any visits where it wasn't mentioned that they chainsawed Jamal Khashoggi.

Speaker 7:
[28:41] Listen, we all remember Joe Biden shaking the hand in someone's hand, although, again, that's not-

Speaker 9:
[28:47] I get it. We haven't even brought this up yet, but it's such an important element of this. The amount of money that the Trump administration, Jared Kushner, Steve Wicoff, et cetera, are making off of this relationship with the Saudis, billions and billions of dollars, is a crucial component of this and why there has been a reorientation of where our allies are. I personally think that there is a way to get new allies without losing the old ones and that we have gained so much from the post-World War II global order, that it makes me heartsick to see the way that we talk about and the way that we deal in policy with folks like the Canadians and even the Europeans and the whole NATO alliance, the every day back and forth, we're going to pull out, we're going to pull out, they need us more than them. They are making plans. It's actually very Trumpy in what's going on vis-a-vis the relationship with China, because they're basically saying, we know who China is. The problem is we don't know who the United States is, and I don't think that that shifts back just because if it's John Ossoff or Marco Rubio or JD Vance or whoever in 2028, you can't undo some of these boomerang effects. We have totally changed the attitude in which people who loved the United States feel about us across Europe and especially in Canada.

Speaker 7:
[30:05] I think we are ignoring the George W. Bush administration where large swaths of Europe determined that the president of the United States was quite terrible.

Speaker 9:
[30:10] A hundred percent, but we actually had managed to get them back, and that took a lot of work, and now we've thrown it to the side again.

Speaker 7:
[30:16] Well, it depends on get them back on what terms. Again, I think it's a little bit more nuanced than just they're on our side, they're not on our side. Again, there are disagreements with allies, one of the big pushes of the Trump administration. So again, there are cases where I think, and I've said, where I think the president has pushed too far. So I think that, for example, suggesting that NATO is completely irrelevant, I disagree with that. And I've said that over and over and over, suggesting that our NATO allies have not been pulling their fair share in terms of their funding of their own defense. I think the president is 100% correct on that. And I think the president also happens to be correct when he is disappointed in our NATO allies for mouthing off consistently about the dangers of an Iranian nuclear program and or terror funding apparatus. And then when the president asks them to help free, for example, the trade of Hormuz, suddenly it's the high five drowning meme. That seems like not particularly welcome policy on the other side. So I think there are a lot of things that can be done better. But I think that to fail to acknowledge that there is not a coincidence of all interests, even with the allies that I wish we had more coincidence of interest is, that's not, again, undermining alliance. I just prefer to be more specific about what we are seeking from particular countries and what that alliance should look like. And by the way, in none of that, do I see an excuse for any of these European countries on a moral basis. And you were just talking a moment ago about the morality of telling the Saudis not to chainsaw people. I mean, at some point, it might be who the Europeans, being the people who seem to be quite fond of lecturing us morally, to ask them why would they be reorienting toward one of the great human rights abusers on planet Earth in the Chinese state?

Speaker 9:
[31:44] Yeah, listen, there are a million people living in a concentration camp in China and no one talks about it. So I completely agree with you there. I have very fond memories of what it looked like when we did have better relations, let's say, certainly with our European allies, and yes, we go on a per country basis, and I know that the specifics of all of this matter, but the mood right now is America goes it alone and America bullies, and we are seeing other very powerful countries that we actually do need on our side, find alternative routes to prosperity and security, and I think that's a net negative for America.

Speaker 7:
[32:25] It depends. I do think that some of the moves that the Trump administration has been making with regards to say India, which is a burgeoning population, a very large democracy, the largest democracy on planet Earth, that the relationship between the president and say Modi of India is significantly warmer than the relationship was between Joe Biden, for example, and Modi. The president has a very solid relationship with the new leader of Japan. The alliances are reshaping and the Europeans, unfortunately, I think, have to a certain extent, put themselves in a backseat position on a lot of matters simply because they've hamstrung their own economic developments, they've hamstrung their own military development. Again, every international agreement is a bit of a game. What that means is that you are actually going to have to strengthen your own hand if you wish to have more of an impact on the United States, which remains the strongest player in that game. Europe has spent decades not strengthening its own hand. Basically, building up its own incompetence. I think that has results. I may not like those results. I may think that it would be better if we were more charitable with the Europeans and gave them more of a transitional off-ramp toward a better partnership with us. I think some parts of Eastern Europe have taken that off-ramp, by the way. The Baltic states, for example, have been significantly more allied with the Trump administration than some of the older Western European states like the UK and France.

Speaker 9:
[33:38] I want to switch to a different topic, but just to add before we get off there, a lot of our Asian allies don't like what's going on in Iran either, and they're talking about rationing fuel and things like that as well. So it's not like we've been best friends to them in this current conflict.

Speaker 8:
[33:55] Okay. Let's take a quick break. Stay with us.

Speaker 5:
[34:00] Maria, you have a podcast now and you need to start acting like it.

Speaker 6:
[34:03] What's the first step as a podcaster?

Speaker 9:
[34:05] Well, you have to ask lots of questions.

Speaker 6:
[34:09] I'm Maria Sharapova and I'm hosting a new podcast called Pretty Tough. Every week, I'm sitting down with trailblazing women at the top of their game to discuss ambition, work ethic, and the ups and downs that come on the path to achieving greatness. I have a few pretty tough questions for you. Ready?

Speaker 4:
[34:26] Ready. Do not sugarcoat something for me.

Speaker 6:
[34:29] No. We'll dive into their stories and get valuable insights from top executives, actors, entrepreneurs, and other individuals who have inspired me so much in my own journey. Pretty tough is your front row seat to the women who have demonstrated the power in being unapologetic in their pursuits. I hope you'll join us. New episodes drop Wednesdays on YouTube or in your favorite podcast app.

Speaker 4:
[34:58] Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, has been talking about the war in Iran in distinctly biblical terms, citing Psalms, the Resurrection of Jesus, and the Book of Quentin.

Speaker 3:
[35:08] And I will strike down upon thee with great vengeance and furious anger those who attempt to capture and destroy my brother.

Speaker 4:
[35:15] President Trump is comparing himself to Christ. Vice President Vance is fighting with the Pope. Watching all of this is the increasingly influential pastor, Doug Wilson. He co-founded the church that Hegseth attends. Wilson is a Christian nationalist who would like the USA to be a theocracy. He'd also like to help us get there, though he doesn't think it's going to happen anytime soon.

Speaker 5:
[35:36] I believe that it is accelerating. I believe that we're making significant gains. I see us assembling resources, and I'm encouraged in that labor. But I don't expect to see what we're praying for in my lifetime.

Speaker 4:
[35:49] Pastor Doug Wilson and how much you should worry about his plans, on Today Explained from Vox, weekdays, afternoons, wherever.

Speaker 9:
[35:58] I want to tell you about a new podcast from Vox called America Actually. It's hosted by political journalist Estet Herndon, who I love. The show asks the question, what will America look like after Donald Trump? Better happen. Trump's been running a one-man show for over a decade, but we're heading towards the first open presidential election since 2016, and it'll play out in a country that will feel very different. America Actually digs deep into the questions that you and friends are asking about politics, culture, and the economy. It'll map out the people and ideas that'll shape the future beyond Trump. You can watch America Actually on the Vox YouTube channel and listen wherever you get your podcasts.

Speaker 8:
[36:35] Welcome back.

Speaker 9:
[36:36] I want to talk while we have you because it's important to get into the real housewives of the right wing and what's going on in your ecosystem. You very publicly called out prominent figures like Yovon and Tucker Carlson, even JD Vance for placating the crazies is how you put it. You're seeing large chunks of that ecosystem move away from Trump, I think in part for grifting, but there is some policy or ideology behind it. I want to play you this clip of Tucker from this week and get your response.

Speaker 1:
[37:08] I mean, you and I and everyone else who supported him, you wrote speeches for him, I campaigned for him. We're implicated in this for sure. Yes. It's not enough to say, well, I changed my mind or like, oh, this is bad, I'm out. It's like in very small ways, but in real ways, you and me and millions of people like us are the reason this is happening right now. Yes. So, I do think it's like a moment to wrestle with our own consciences. We'll be tormented by it for a long time. I will be. I want to say I'm sorry for misleading people and it was not intentional. That's all I'll say.

Speaker 9:
[37:48] Do you think any of that is genuine?

Speaker 7:
[37:51] I think that he thought that President Trump was a person President Trump never was. I think that is perfectly obvious. He's been calling the president effectively the Antichrist for the last several weeks at this point while trafficking in his usual toxic brew of conspiracism and idiocy. This is a person who spent the last two years traveling to a wide variety of foreign adversaries to talk about why they are superior to the United States, sniffing bread at Russian grocery stores and explaining why Sharia law in major cities is superior to anything that we have here in the United States. And then speaking with Alexander Dugan, widely known as Putin's brain, about how a multipolar system in which the United States cedes global power to places like Russia and China would be better for the United States and for the world. And so frankly, people who hold that viewpoint, I think, are not natural allies inside the Trump administration. So I'm not going to take that as some sort of insult to Trump. But what I will say is that I'm very pleased that the president's policy does not mirror the desires of Tucker Carlson and his wing of the Republican Party. And if he thought that it did, that was a major misapprehension, I would say, on his part.

Speaker 9:
[38:55] Is there real fragmentation?

Speaker 7:
[38:57] Of course, there was always going to be fragmentation in a second term of a presidency. I've actually yet to see any time when there wasn't fairly significant fragmentation moving forward at the end of a two-term presidency, which effectively we are entering into that period, because whoever is the uniting figure is no longer going to be the uniting figure three years from now. And so people inside that broader kind of movement start to look at, okay, who's the next guy? What is the next thing that's going to happen? And in the Republican Party, where there's pretty significant debate between a wide variety of wings and a lot of these matters, that is breaking out into the open. I don't find any of that particularly shocking. The only thing that I do find shocking is, you know, again, some of the sort of conspiratorial nonsense, and that is a kind way of putting it, that has been promoted by some of these major influencers.

Speaker 8:
[39:42] Ben, I like what you said about, and I think it's true, that war is, the success or failure of a war is determined several years out, in terms of the state of play, what it means for reshaping the geopolitical table, if you will. I want to put forward a thesis and get your comments to it. I believe that President Trump's second term will largely be disqualified based on what I see as unprecedented corruption. While I believe that corruption is present on both sides of the aisle, I think it has been all caps with Trump, whether it's enriching their kids, deals that seem to be quid pro quo, that directly enrich the president, what I believe is the greatest example of insider trading on any scale that's taking place around geopolitical movements and unusual options trading. I want to be clear, I don't have proof of that yet. I have proof something is going on. I don't have proof who's doing it. But it does feel like the level of corruption, the quid pro quo here, the just naked attempt to leverage the office and the full faith and credit and power of the US government to enrich him and his allies is beyond anything we have ever seen.

Speaker 7:
[40:47] I mean, I agree that corruption is going to be a major issue going forward until the 28 election and beyond. I think that the crypto schemes that have been run, particularly Middle East are going to be a real issue. I'm kind of frankly shocked. They have not been an issue before now, because they have been widely reported on. I mean, there's been wide reporting on, for example, World Liberty Financial, which is a crypto firm that the Wittkopf boys and I think some of the Trump kids have been involved with. And for a long time in the World Liberty Financial website, the president was listed as chief advisor while he was president. So, yes, I do think that that sort of issue is going to rear its ugly head and frankly should rear its ugly head because I don't think that that sort of activity should be taking place. Is that going to disqualify all effects of his presidency? Probably not. I mean, it depends which thing is going to reshape, you know, all actions can be separately adjudicated. When the history books are written, it's going to be a lot. I mean, this year is going to be a lot. And a lot of, I think, conflicting variants, strands. Yeah, the comprehensive Trump years series, I mean, we're in season 11 of Trump. And I will say that every year adds new and strange wrinkles, both good and bad. I used to do a routine on the show called Good Trump, Bad Trump, which one will we get today? And so, at the same time that I'm extraordinarily praiseworthy of the president's foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, when it comes to the way that he has treated the crypto industry, or when it comes to members of his family, who have been, I think, operating in ways that if they're last name were Biden, I would be screaming about. So I try to be fair about that. Yes, I think that that will be part of the story too.

Speaker 8:
[42:19] One question about the upcoming election, and then I have a question that's more personal in nature. I'm curious to get who you think, if you were to bet on horses from the Republican and the Democratic Party in 28, like if you had to go on calisthenics and someone gave you 100 bucks and said, do your best to manage this like a hedge fund and pick the right candidates from both sides of the aisle, who would you pick and why? And what do you think the underlying dynamics are as we go into what will be an increasingly long presidential season?

Speaker 7:
[42:45] I mean, first of all, don't bet on things you don't know anything about. Like this is such a hard question. I mean, it's truly a hard question because I think there are some known unknowns and there's a lot of unknown unknowns here. I mean, I could see a world where JD Vance decides based on the outcome of the midterm elections and his own approval ratings to forego a run entirely because he feels like 2028 is sort of a poison chalice. That's a possibility. I think that if you were to ballpark it right now, you'd have to say that Vance is obviously the favorite for the nomination because until the president withdraws his support for the vice president, he's still considered the sort of heir apparent. And so if you're betting on the nomination in this moment right now, you'd still have probably some best available information. You'd still put your money probably on the vice president of the United States. Inside the Democratic Party, I do think that Gavin Newsom is fairly well placed because Gavin Newsom is, in my opinion, willing to say anything to anyone at any time in order to achieve what he wants to achieve, which is a comfortable place to be to a certain extent and he has hit on the magic of basically trolling the president as his primary method of garnering attention. And when I look at some of the other candidates who are being put forward, I think they have pretty fatal flaws electorally inside the primary coalition. Alexander Ocasio-Cortez may be popular in Iowa. I have a doubt that you will be very popular in, say, South Carolina. I think that you might be get treated like Bernie Sanders would in South Carolina. I think John Ossoff is unlikely to win a single primary. I think that some of the people who are being pushed forward by the Democratic more elite side of the establishment are going to have a tough time breaking through. It's why there's a vast gap between an income and a racial level in support for, say, Pete Buttigieg, who's a favorite among sort of intellectual elites on the Democratic side. But I think we'll have trouble getting through a primary season that involves any state outside of Iowa, New Hampshire. So it's hard to call. I would say that Newsom has done a fairly good job of building up a somewhat robust base across a variety of demographics. And that puts him right now in the catbird seat, but not by much.

Speaker 8:
[44:39] So I mean this sincerely, Ben. I appreciate, I struggle with, I do think you're brave. And that is, I never see a waiver from your views, even when you get shamed and attacked from the people you used to break bread with, at least philosophically. And I really respect and admire that. And I struggle with that because I find sometimes I can be shamed by the comments and I start diluting or watering down my views. And it's something I'm trying to not do. And you're a role model for that. You just don't waiver. Does this take a toll when you get attacked from the people who used to be kind of your choir, if you will, or your congregation? How do you deal with it personally? Doesn't it take a toll on you just emotionally and at home to be attacked pretty viciously and pretty publicly by some of the people who used to be, for lack of a better term, your colleagues and your cohort? How do you deal with it personally?

Speaker 7:
[45:28] I mean, obviously, it's had a major impact on my life. I have 24-7 security. I've had 24-7 security for several years at this point. I have security on my children as well. They're used to it. It's sort of just part of our daily routine, which is kind of insane. It's also, as I've said before, the threats that we get, the number of threats that we get, and the variety of sources of the threats that I think somewhat unique in American public life. It's not universally from one side. I would say that we have a nice diverse broad range of viewpoints from which the Kill Ben Shapiro movement springs. So it's good to know that I have a solid base of support, again, across various demographics for that proposition. But the way that we deal with it is that I have a very, very close family, not just me and my wife and my kids. I have four kids, a fifth on the way. But also, I have sisters who live nearby. I have parents and in-laws who live nearby. We are in a very solid Orthodox community, Jewish community, which means that we're surrounded by people who love us and care about us and want the best for us. Also, we have systems for feedback, meaning people who I'm friends with and people who we work with, who I trust to give me bad news when I'm making a mistake, which is not infrequent. If I say something that's wrong, I want to be able to hear that what I've said is wrong. I will say the best way to keep sanity is to stay off X as much as humanly possible, which is a repository of the insane. And I think that that's true of comment sections more generally, the people who have time to comment very often are not the kinds of people who you should probably be listening to when it comes to shaping your policy. But it is definitely an appeal to the lizard brain. And I will say that it will wreck your life if you spend time looking at that sort of stuff. It was probably five, six years ago that my wife told me that Twitter was ruining my life and I needed to get off of it. And I actually got, I took it off my phone. And so now if I want to send some sort of tweet, I will actually send it to my team, I'll text it to my team to tweet on my behalf, because I just don't want to spend any time in what I think is a place that tears away at the soul.

Speaker 8:
[47:25] Yeah, the most accretive thing I've done other than fitness and time with family is literally getting off of X.

Speaker 9:
[47:31] I guess I'm the only one who still has to get off of X. It is eating my soul. And I love what you're saying about your feedback mechanisms and surrounding yourself with people who are supportive, but also will tell you when you're wrong and talk that through with you. I just finished writing a book about that, so I want to talk to you more about that. But I'm curious, looking ahead to the generations that are coming up, who increasingly do live in these silos, are you optimistic about the future of people engaging with folks who have opposing political opinions to them, very strongly held ones, that you'll be able to go back to college campuses without security, that what happened to Charlie Kirk wouldn't happen again? What do you think about the future?

Speaker 7:
[48:17] I'm pretty skeptical, given the fact that so many young people are spending an enormous amount of time online. I say on my show all the time that people really need to touch grass. I have Sabbath, which means that I am mandated by my religion to get offline between basically Friday night and Saturday night. It is a lifesaver, but I think that everybody needs to get involved in social institutions where they actually meet flesh and blood human beings and deal with flesh and blood human beings who are commonly oriented toward a better version of what America is and what America should be and interpersonal relations that are not just yelling at each other online. I think that the biggest thing that I've been talking about a lot on my show over the course of the past few years, I see the rise of an economic populism that is, I think, wildly anti-markets and the rise of a sort of bizarre third-worldest anti-Americanism on the foreign stage. The amount of ingratitude that I think is bred by an online society is truly astonishing. The fact that I'm so grateful for the life I've been able to live in this country, and again, I did not grow up rich. I mean, we grew up, I would say, lower middle middle class. I grew up in a small home in Burbank, California, is 1,100 square feet living with three sisters and two parents in a two-bedroom, one-bath house. It was great. It was great because we lived in America and because I had a great family, and because eventually my parents got a slightly bigger house, and then I went to a good school and I was able to get a bigger house than that and make my way. Now, that's an opportunity that nobody else, virtually all of human history had. I think that the thing that really makes me sick to my stomach right now is not just a broad feeling of ingratitude for what we actually have, but an ingratitude that's cultivated by precisely the influencers we're talking about, the demoralization op that says that your life is terrible, you can't get ahead, nothing you do is going to matter, and that the only way to strike back is to talk about an evil cadre of elites who are trying to manipulate the system on their own behalf, which makes you frustrated, more aggrieved, and less likely to succeed in your own life. There are, of course, public policy problems, and those public policy problems should have solutions that we can discuss, but I think that what we need to do more than anything else, if somebody is not offering you solutions, then they are part of the problem.

Speaker 8:
[50:13] Avoid the demoralization op and get out and meet people in flesh and blood. Ben Shapiro is the host of The Ben Shapiro Show and co-founder of The Daily Wire. Ben, we really appreciate your time today.

Speaker 7:
[50:27] Thanks so much.

Speaker 8:
[50:29] Jess, what do you think?

Speaker 9:
[50:30] I thought it was really interesting. I disagreed with a lot, which I expected to, especially on the foreign policy front. I would have liked to talk more about how Israel is operating in the region, and I thought it was interesting that he's not concerned about the future of the relationship or the perception of Israel within the country, because that seems really important to me. But I appreciate how Ben puts himself out there, and he's got a line, and he's very good at arguing in it and sticking to it, and also very respectful. So I'm thrilled that we had him.

Speaker 8:
[51:06] Yeah, I don't think anyone articulates that position better than Ben. I don't think anyone is better prepared to argue those points, and I really do respect his bravery. I don't think this guy wavers. The issue I wish I had addressed to him, and we'll give him a chance to come back on, is I think he identifies crazies. I think he's fine with crazy right-wing social policy that's quite frankly coarse and cruel. He defines crazy, I find, usually someone who's anti-Israel, that that's his red line, that they can be incredibly coarse and cruel and demonize special interest groups. And I don't want to say he's an apologist for him, that would be unfair, but he defines crazies as anyone who's that and anti-Israel. But I don't think there's a better spokesperson for that viewpoint. And what we want to do here at Raging Moderates is bring on people like that, many of the viewpoints we disagree with, but have a thoughtful conversation and understand or have an intelligent person who's unafraid to articulate those viewpoints. And Ben does that really well. So I was actually really excited to have him on the program.

Speaker 9:
[52:13] Yeah, me too. And I wish we talked about the GOP more, because he was a DeSantis guy in 2024, which has to do also with the cruelty and the coarseness that you're talking about. He's much more conservative than we are, so there are certain beliefs that he's just going to have that we don't. But he went out there and said Trump shouldn't be the guy.

Speaker 8:
[52:30] But doesn't DeSantis feel warm and cuddly right now?

Speaker 9:
[52:33] I mean, I don't know. I still do not. But everything is. This is the lowest bar in history. Fair point. Yeah.

Speaker 8:
[52:41] Romney feels like Kennedy at this point.

Speaker 9:
[52:43] Oh, Mitt Romney and George Bush could be my kids' godparents. Yeah, compared to their shit. Yeah.

Speaker 8:
[52:50] Yeah, agreed.

Speaker 9:
[52:51] All right. I'll see you tomorrow.

Speaker 8:
[52:53] All right. Thanks, Jess.