transcript

Speaker 1:
[00:00] A discussion on the pivot to Asia, its past, its present and its future, next on The Impossible State.

Speaker 2:
[00:09] North Korea is the Impossible State. It's a place that stumped leaders and policymakers for more than three decades. It has a complex history, and it has become one of the United States top national security priorities. Each week on this show, we'll talk with the people who know the most about North Korea.

Speaker 1:
[00:33] Welcome to another episode of The Impossible State podcast at CSIS. I'm your host, Victor Cha, president of geopolitics and foreign policy here at CSIS, Korea chair and also professor at Georgetown. I feel like I haven't been on this show in a while. Anyway, it's good to see everybody. Today we're going to be talking about the pivot to Asia, with two very good guests from CSIS and AEI. Joining us is Zach Cooper, who is senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He is a CSIS alum. We knew him when he was just about this tall, before he became this giant in US security policy. Zach has been at CSIS. He was also at the German Marshall Fund and worked on the staff of the National Security Council, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He is the author of Tides of Fortune, The Rise and Decline of Great Militaries. That is a pretty expansive title. He did his PhD at Princeton and his BA at Stanford. Also joining us is Kristi Govella, our Senior Advisor in Japan Chair here at CSIS. She's also a Professor of Japanese Studies at Oxford. We just had a great conference at Oxford last week. That was real, that was excellent on economic security. Previously, she was the Inaugural Director of the Congressionally Funded Center for Indo-Pacific Studies at the University of Hawaii and was also at the DOD-funded Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies as an Associate Professor. She also has West Coast roots, having done her PhD at Berkeley and her BA at the University of Washington, Seattle. So thank you both for joining us on this episode to talk about the pivot to Asia. I think it's a great time for us to be talking about this because, as we'll talk about, the question really has come up about how much attention the United States can pay to Asia, given all that is going on elsewhere in the world, particularly in the Middle East. But maybe, Kristi, if we could start with you and start as a way of background for our listeners and viewers who normally expect to talk about North Korea on this podcast, but there's only so much North Korea you can talk about. But maybe as background, you could tell us a little bit about how the pivot to Asia materialized, what was the rationale behind it, and given your expertise on Japan, how Japan figured in this broader concept.

Speaker 3:
[03:11] Thanks, Victor, for having me. Yes, I think it's a very appropriate time to talk about this topic. So the pivot to Asia began in 2011 with President Obama, essentially recognizing that the US had been mired in the Middle East and its focus had been there for a decade. But really, the big opportunities as well as challenges lay in Asia. So he had this idea that the US would refocus his attention across multiple dimensions. So one was security, and of course, he had China in mind at that time, as China was becoming increasingly assertive. Of course, the threats from North Korea and other challenges. But he also outlined economic opportunities, talking about trade. At that time, the comprehensive and progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership was just the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and it was on the rise. He was also thinking about regional institutions, which at that time meant the East Asia Summit. When was the last time we really talked about the East Asia Summit? But that was another part of engagement, as well as more values-based or governance issues like human rights. So he had this comprehensive plan for that. And interestingly, as soon as the pivot was announced, it essentially, I think, was criticized almost from the very beginning. But some people felt, of course, that America's attention withdrawn to Asia would take it away from more important things. So it was quickly rebranded as the rebalance. And then, you know, I think we've had conversations over the last 15 years about how this is going, if it was always going too slowly, the US has been continually distracted, etc. But I think the big headline from the pivot was really this idea that the US should focus on Asia because that was where the future was. So of course, Japan figured prominently into that. Over the last 15 years, we saw the rise of Indo-Pacific strategies that really began with Japan's free and Indo-Pacific, free and open Indo-Pacific vision. But I'm sure we'll get into a discussion of exactly what that implementation looks like. Maybe I'll just note that until this second Trump administration started, we had seen a relatively consistent rhetorical emphasis on Asia across Republican and Democratic administrations from Obama, through Trump won, through Biden. So we do seem to be experiencing something a bit different now. So maybe I'll leave it there.

Speaker 1:
[05:27] Okay, great. Thank you. Wonderful way to start. So let me go to Zach and start with your foreign affairs article, which we will pull up a copy of the cover title page of it. This was called Asia After America, where the pivot to Asia, as Kristi described in your argument, or the rebalance, never really materialized. So maybe you could tell us a little bit about why you think that's the case, whether we ever really pivoted to Asia beyond the rhetoric, and if so, why it has failed.

Speaker 4:
[06:06] Well, first, Victor, it's great to be back here. I feel like this is coming a little bit full circle for me, because when I got hired at CSIS, as you may remember, I was hired to do work on the pivot. And to do a series of assessments with Mike Greene and David Berteaux and Cath Hicks on both whether the pivot was being effective and what we needed to do to strengthen it, and much of this we had a chance to do together, so it's great to be back here.

Speaker 1:
[06:32] This is one for our viewers, again, who don't know the history of CSIS. We hired these two hotshot PhDs out of Columbia and Princeton. Their names were Zach Cooper and Mira Rapp Hooper. They also rhymed on top of everything else, and the rest is history. Anyway, go on, Zach.

Speaker 4:
[06:47] Well, so I feel like so much of the work that I got to do here was thinking hard about what the pivot meant, what it was required to be effective. And so I had a little bit of a hard time writing a piece saying that the pivot has failed, having put 15 years of my career into trying to think about how to make it effective. But I think we're now at a point where we have to ask some really hard questions about whether our old strategy in Asia is still going to last. Obviously, we're asking a lot of those questions in the last few weeks, as we see the US once again get into a big war in the Middle East. As Kristi said, the whole logic of the pivot was to pivot away from the Middle East and to Asia. And we've been long on rhetoric and I think short on action in that regard. And we've now of course seen on the military side, forces pulled from Korea, from Japan, perhaps from elsewhere, out of Asia, into the Middle East yet again. But I think this is only part of the story. There's a much broader story, which is about, as Kristi was saying, the economic strategy, right? The Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was supposed to root the US in the region. It's about diplomatic and political engagement, which in my view has also been lacking. And so I'd say broadly what I think we see if we step back over the last 15 years is very consistent US rhetoric about just how important Asia is, and then an unwillingness or inability of American policymakers to follow through and really prioritize Asia, put the resources into the region. And as a result, I think the impact has been the Trump administration is sort of pulling back to the first island chain, especially to Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines, and maybe also adding in South Korea. I don't want to draw another Acheson line again, keeping Australia in the mix. But those five locations, I think, are the real focus area, and very much on the military side. But in South Asia, the rest of Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, I think we're seeing a decrease in effort. And outside of the military sphere, I think we're also seeing a decrease in effort. And I'll just leave it here. What we wrote when I was here at CSIS was that for the rebalance to be effective, it had to have a strong economic and political component. And those have been remarkably weak across administrations.

Speaker 1:
[09:19] Thanks. So I want to talk about the resource side of the pivot in a minute. But let me just go to the sort of Washington politics question, which is, to what extent, I think everyone agrees that the United States has been distracted, focused on the Middle East, focused on other issues. To what extent is this failure of the pivot something that blame could be placed with both Republican and Democratic administrations? Because you could argue that on something like TPP, right? There were administrations that were against it, that were in favor of the pivot, right? And on the military side, there's been support for the pivot, but there hasn't been the sort of defense spending that we were supposed to see. So maybe you could take that on first.

Speaker 4:
[10:09] Yeah, look, I think it's hard to apportion blame. Clearly, I think the Trump administration has really reset the US approach in the region, probably more than any other administration. But I've thought for quite some time that the US was not accomplishing its objectives in Asia pre-Trump 2.0. Adam Liff and I wrote a separate piece in Foreign Affairs five years ago, saying that the pivot was in trouble. That was really under the Obama era, sorry, under the Biden era. I think what's tough is if you went and asked folks like Kurt Campbell, Kurt in his book about the pivot actually raised exactly the problems that have come about. He warned that we would have a tough time focusing enough resources in the region, that we would be challenged to avoid distractions elsewhere. I think you've got really smart Asia experts who knew that these changes were going to be incredibly hard to make across administrations. I don't think that there's much that they could have done. I think this is more of a national question about constraining presidents from always going back to the Middle East, which Victor, you and I were in the George W. Bush administration. So it's hard for me to critique others for getting us deeper into the Middle East when we did that ourselves. But I think this has been a tendency of both parties. Finally, on the economic side, I think when we do the retrospective on the pivot, we're going to look back and decide that in 2015 or 16, if the Trans-Pacific Partnership had been ratified by the Senate, we might be in a really different world. I think that was the moment that things went off the rails. And unfortunately, that was a bipartisan action. Some Republicans would have voted for it, but I think President Obama probably didn't push as hard as he could have. And then, of course, we had President Trump come in and reject it right off the bat. But Hillary Clinton ran against it also after being the Secretary of State who pushed it the hardest. So I think it's been unfortunately both parties have been responsible for some of the problems.

Speaker 1:
[12:26] No, that's a great point. And if I could go to Kristi on that. I mean, if we think about TPP and eventually the US not supporting it, Japan paid a big role in eventually turning it into CPTPP. Maybe you could speak a little bit about how you look at what Zach mentioned, sort of this decision in 2015 for the United States not to support TPP and why that was, of course, it was an economic and trade based decision, but it had broader meaning. Maybe you could say a little bit about that.

Speaker 3:
[12:58] Sure. I agree with much of what Zach said. I think that really when we look across the past 15 years, both Republican and Democratic administrations really struggled to make the pivot happen. I think that we have to keep in mind that part of this was due to events outside their control and such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine as well as shifting domestic political opinion. But on TPP, I have vivid memories of teaching in Hawaii at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia Pacific Center of Security Studies and giving a lecture the day that Trump withdrew from TPP on our trade policy. We had been saying things like, TPP is as important to the US as another aircraft carrier and all of these things, to really link it to our security. But in the end, what we found was that domestic public opinion had been shifting in ways that really pushed the US towards a more economically nationalist position. And Trump made that turn dramatically when he withdrew. But then we saw continuity actually through the Biden administration, which was not able to embrace free trade again. And I think they were notably different in that they tried to engage through IPEF in different kinds of ways on supply chain resilience, economic security. So the rhetoric was much different. There was still a positive economic agenda to offer. Whereas with the Trump administration, it's increasingly so just all sticks, no carrots when it comes to economics in the region. So I think that that has been a big challenge. I mean, the appeal of the US in the region is both its security benefits for some as well as to many more of its economic benefits. And unfortunately, I mean, the Trump administration the first time around got us started down this path, but we're really not anywhere near getting off of it anytime soon. So I think that is presenting a very, very strong challenge for US engagement in the Indo-Pacific today.

Speaker 1:
[14:53] Yeah, in my classroom, I used to tell students about how the United States position Asia rested on sort of three legs. It was a three-legged stool, the security part, the values part, and of course, the trade and economic and investment side of it. And TPP was such a big part of that. And for the United States to turn away from that was, as you both said, was really critical in terms of the pivot. Can we just go back to this point? We keep referring to like we get pulled back to the Middle East. So, again, I want to talk about the resources part of the pivot in a moment. But when we talk about sort of how the United States is not able to sustain attention on Asia, the Indo-Pacific as a sort of top strategic area for the United States, why do you think that's the case? I mean, of course, there are crises that erupt or that happen in other parts of the world, but why are we not able to do this? Like, for example, if we go back to Kurt Campbell's book, not to put words in Kurt's mouth, but I remember in his Pivot to Asia book, he talks about how there's just this general sort of Eurocentric bias among the American foreign policy establishment. Maybe that has something to do with it. But why do you think that we cannot sustain it? Putting aside the resource question.

Speaker 4:
[16:18] I think there's something about just the history of American strategic thought. We are used to 80 years going back to the Second World War of being active really in three regions outside of the Americas, in Europe, in Asia, and in the Middle East. I think the history of great powers is they keep doing the same thing until they're forced to stop. Again, not to put words in Kurt's mouth, but I think part of the rebalance logic was that the US had to stop this, that the US had to start making some tougher choices and making some priorities, and I think the logic of the pivot was so clear to try and force this discussion among the strategic community, and yet I just don't think Americans are in the strategic community are quite there yet. They don't think that it's required. They feel like we can still be present in all three of these regions, and now kind of a fourth in the Americas at the same time. Without getting into the resource question, which I know we'll get to in a minute, it reminds me of something that Eric Edelman used to say to me when I would argue that we should get out of the Middle East. He would say, you may not be interested in the Middle East, but the Middle East is interested in you. Every time that we end up getting into another major operation in the region, I think of that. I just think this is historically what great powers do, unless they have a really jarring experience. I'm thinking of the British East of Suez, or the Brits, again, when they in 1904, 1905, pull back their forces basically from the world and just recenter them on the North Sea. But this requires a very high perceived threat, and often like a political crisis at the same time. I just don't think we've experienced those together in the United States.

Speaker 1:
[18:22] Okay. I mean, at the same time, though, and I'll go to Kristi on this. I mean, Japan, particularly recently, is very well the threat from China. I mean, if we're talking about what focuses the great powers' attention, it is rising threats from other potential competitors of great powers. And we've been talking about the China threat for how long now. But that doesn't seem to do it. It certainly has done it for Japan. But why hasn't it done it for the United States? Or, I mean, again, it has, but it hasn't in the sense that that has allowed the pivot to flourish. So why is that?

Speaker 3:
[19:00] I mean, I agree with a bunch of what Zach said. Maybe I'll just add that I think some of it is inherent in the US being a global power. I think that it has many interests to manage within administrations. There are competing voices about where priorities should be. I mean, part of the reason it moved from the pivot to the rebalance was that the pivot created a lot of anxiety in other quarters that it would take resources or attention away. So in some sense, the US can never really say that it's focusing his attention anywhere. There's always a reactionary push and pull with these things, which is then also exacerbated by real life events. So to some extent, I think it's natural. I think that these kinds of initiatives are always going to be critiqued because you'll never satisfy those who want more attention in one region, and you'll always dissatisfy everybody who wants you to do everything. But I think what we've seen though in the most recent administration in approaching, taking office is there's also a lot of debate about where US interests should be, and the extent to which the US should be playing these global roles. I mean, I've heard some people say that it's not actually that the US wants to pull back its attention. It still wants to do everything. It just doesn't want to pay for it. It doesn't want to bear the burden. And I think that is true in some ways. And so I think, Zach, in your piece, you're pointing out a more realistic strategy that can be actually implemented. And I think some people are thinking that way. Some people are thinking in terms of what they would like to have and what they can get away with. But I think part of it is just the struggles of being a global power and then increasingly lack of consensus about what the US should be doing.

Speaker 1:
[20:36] Okay. Let's go to the resources question. So yes, we can certainly say the pivot has been under resourced. But we've been saying that for a while, right? I remember it was, I think it was during the Obama administration, there was a Senate report that came out that said that the pivot was under resourced, that it was high on rhetoric, it was under resourced, and it was too focused on the military side, right? And now we have complaints that the pivot, in one sense, may be saying the right thing, but it's under resourced on the security side, and the fact that we're not seeing the sort of defense budget increases that match the rhetoric that come from the administration. So I think we sort of covered the economic side pretty well in the sense that, you know, the US inability to engage on TPP for a number of different reasons was a very important turning point. I remember I gave testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, where the great late Senator McCain said, why do you think it's bad that we're not in TPP? That goes beyond trade. And of course, it had everything to do with strategy and the US place in Asia. But maybe we could talk a little bit about why we have been unsuccessful at resourcing the pivot, whether it's in terms of on the military side or on the economic side.

Speaker 4:
[22:06] Yeah, I guess on the military side, I think the reality is the United States could spend a lot more money on its military if it wanted to. So if you look at the GDP percentage that we spend on defense compared to what we spent in the Cold War, it's much lower. We're in the 3 percent range. There are times in the Cold War where we're spending well over 10 percent of GDP on defense. I'm not suggesting that we go back there. I'm just saying we act as if we're at a maximum level of defense spending. I don't think it's actually true, but it doesn't matter because politically, even though President Trump says he wants to spend $1.5 trillion on defense this year, I would be shocked if we get a significant increase in the defense budget. And I think without that, all you have left is what we were just talking about, which is pulling resources from other locations. So if we're not going to pull resources from other locations, and if the distraction is actually going up rather than down in those places, then the only thing you're left with is either to decrease your aims or to increase your spending. And I think somehow over the last 15 years, we've done neither. We've actually basically kept our objectives the same without spending more. And Lindsay Ford has a great piece from a few years ago, where she calls us out as an example of the Lippman gap, basically a disconnect between resources and our strategy. And I think this is so true. And on the defense side, it's made even worse by the fact that 10 years ago, we were worried about US resourcing compared to China. Well, over that 10 years, the Chinese spending on defense has gone up dramatically. And US spending in relative terms has been relatively low. You know, we were not even in some years compensating for the inflation adjustment that we'd have to make. And so I think this worsening situation has just compounded year after year to the point that now we're in a situation where the Chinese, they're not outspending the United States, but they have a much simpler military challenge in some ways, whereas we have to project power from across the other side of the globe, and also around the world to deal with these other challenges. And I think that's just compounded the resourcing problem that we're facing.

Speaker 1:
[24:27] Right. So, Kristi, let me go to you. Anything you want to say on this question, but also we have the Japanese Prime Minister coming to Washington this week. What do you think that Tokyo is hoping to hear from the United States right now? Are they seeking reassurance from the United States about commitments? Or are they preparing for a future where the US presence in Asia could be significantly reduced?

Speaker 3:
[24:58] So, on the resourcing side, maybe I'll just say a little bit about the economic part, because I think that's important, too. And the US has been very challenged in resourcing its economic engagement, which I think is why it's been so inconsistent. I mean, even in times where administrations like the Biden administration and the first Trump administration were animated by issues of infrastructure to compete with the Belt and Road Initiative, but they were never able to put forward a public investment to really make that happen. When they tried to mobilize private investment, we had the Blue Dot Network, which never really was taken advantage of by anyone. So we had these cases where even when there was a will, there really wasn't the economic oomph behind it. Foreign aid stayed relatively consistent, and now of course has dropped precipitously. Then what we really had was the appeal of the US market, the ability to grant trade access. When that went away with TPP, we're really left with economic security engagement, things like French shoring, supply chain resilience, regulatory harmonization. Those were comforting to some, but really didn't have the appeal. I think again, like on the military side, the economic side also suffered from that lack of willingness to put American resources behind it, to really demonstrate that engagement and convince people and countries in Asia that were then and still are asking questions about the seriousness of US economic engagement. On the upcoming summit, well, things are changing quickly, minute by minute. So depending on when viewers are watching this, the situation may already have changed. But maybe I'll say that what Prime Minister Takaichi was initially hoping to do was to essentially, I think, stabilize and get reassurance about the state of the US-Japan relationship, to demonstrate Tokyo's desire and ability to implement the trade agreement, to put forward some initiatives on economic security and solidify the defense relationship. And to, when Trump was planning to go visit Xi in April, to make sure that both countries were on the same page about key issues like Taiwan, like about the ongoing Sino-Japanese tensions that have been running since November. So I think that was the original agenda. And I think for Tokyo, we always hear when talking to Japanese colleagues that there really is no plan B, no alternative to the U.S.-Japan alliance. And so, shoring up this relationship really is a high priority. They also have a lot of other relationships they're pursuing, but they see those as complementary and, you know, as sort of a necessary part of something that is centered around the US. But now, with everything in Iran, I think that, you know, the agenda is shifting and it's not exactly clear what the US is going to ask Japan for when she arrives. But I think it's now going to be a conversation about, you know, how Japan can and will contribute to this, and in some senses might be a bit of a litmus test for loyalty or engagement. So I think that in that sense, Tokyo probably wants to emphasize that, you know, the US and Japan are strong partners and Japan sees itself as, you know, being supportive of its ally, but there are also constraints, real constraints on what Japan can do. And in some ways, or in a lot of ways, what's being asked of it is going to really stretch their ability and it's going to require political debate, etc. So I think they'll seek understanding for that. But I hope for some kind of window where they can do something that won't really put Prime Minister Takaichi under extreme political pressure.

Speaker 1:
[28:35] There really is a case of, as you just said earlier, Zach, quoting our friend, Harry Gatleman, the Middle East, you may not be interested in the Middle East, but the Middle East is interested in you. And that has certainly been the case for Asia policy, right? Trump today said that he's asked Xi to put off the trip for five weeks or so. And now these calls for Japan and Korea to send minesweepers or other things to guard the strait. What do you think the Allies are going to do on this? I mean, we've kind of heard what some of the Europeans have said, but both the Koreans and the Japanese have been a little bit, they haven't said no, they haven't said yes, but they haven't said no. I mean, first, I guess, what do you think about the way that we started out talking about how the origins of the pivot, and as you said, to move away from the Middle East, but now the Middle East seems to be engulfing all of our Asia policy, whether it's with China or with the Allies, summits being postponed, summit agendas being hijacked by this issue. Your thoughts?

Speaker 4:
[29:40] I think this just feels like every other administration where we say, oh no, Asia Pacific is the priority, and then we say, well, we've got this little Middle East thing we have to deal with in the short term, but once we're done with that, we're gonna turn back to Asia, don't worry, and we do that every four years. But I think you're right, the summit, just as Kristi was saying, is getting hijacked by Iran. The focus is shifting away really from the core U.S.-Japan alliance issues from the US regional strategy to the extent that we have one. So this feels like a replay of history to me. I think unfortunately for Tokyo, for Seoul, the reality is I don't think they're in a position to just say no. I think it's going to have to be yes, but. So do I expect Japanese minesweepers in the Strait of Hormuz? No chance, especially since the Europeans are making quite clear that they're not about to do this. But could Japan offer perhaps to help with some refueling operations? Maybe, as long as they're conducted far out in the Indian Ocean, away from any Iranian potential strikes. Yeah, that might be a way for Japan to show some moderate level of support for the United States without risking getting directly attacked in the Strait. That's, of course, going to be politically challenging for Takaichi if she were to agree to do something of that sort. But I don't think she can come here and just tell Trump, sorry, we're not doing this. And I think President Trump is quite clear, he's a transactional guy. And these alliances, as you noted at the outset, Victor, we always argue that values were kind of central to the effectiveness of the pivot. Well, President Trump is not a believer in the values component of American strategy. It's all about these transactions. And right now the transaction he cares about is allied contributions on Iran. And so I think Japan, Korea are going to have to offer up some allied contributions. And this is going to be politically tough, because we're already seeing the US pull forces out of Japan and Korea at the same time. So it really feels like there's this sucking sound of US forces, but maybe even Japan and Korean forces away from their focus on the Middle East, or focus on Asia and towards the Middle East.

Speaker 1:
[32:06] Yeah, there's an interesting piece by our good friend, Mike Greene, also in Foreign Affairs, so this big advertisement for Dan Kurtz-Valent in Foreign Affairs about how basically, allies like Japan and Korea, trust in the United States has gone down, but reliance has not, right? For a variety of different reasons, and for that reason, it may be hard for them to say no, so they could say no, which probably wouldn't go very well. They could say yes and hope for getting points for being loyal, but as you said, Trump doesn't really put a lot of stock in anything but transactional, or they could say yes, but I want something in return, whether it's tariffs, tariff reductions, or the investment deals reducing the investment, they could be transactional about it in the same way. Last question for both of you. How is, do you think China is looking at all of this? I mean, Iran, Zach's piece, the US disengagement in the trade space on Asia, I mean, how do you think China is looking at all of this, Kristi?

Speaker 3:
[33:24] Maybe if I could just add one thing on the previous question before I answer that. I mean, I do think that there are lots of things that I think Japan and Korea could do to demonstrate support for the US. And I think there are some things that Takaichi is expected to announce on Thursday that can be framed in light of this. For example, Japan is widely expected to join Golden Dome, and I think that if Japan contributes to missile production to replace, you know, stocks that are used in Iran, that is a help. I think there are other things that can be framed in this. But I do think that Takaichi is in a sensitive position because when you look at the public opinion polling in Japan, something like 75 to 85 percent of the Japanese public is not a fan of this conflict. And we know that Takaichi would like to potentially pursue revising the Constitution and making other defense-related reforms that would enable Japan to do more. But I think that she has to balance supporting the US with risking over-stretching this now for an unpopular cause and then perhaps undercutting her future efforts to make changes because the Japanese public, like many other publics, is worried about entrapment in conflicts that don't really involve them. And this is kind of a classic example of that. So it's a little dangerous to lean too far forward right now and then perhaps show people exactly what they were fearing of and then perhaps undercut some of these other efforts. So I think there are lots of things that Japan can do, and I think they will offer up some, but they'll have to balance it. With how China is seeing this, I think that, you know, I think, as with many strategic situations, seeing your adversary or rival distracted with their hands in too many pots is never a bad thing. And I think that, you know, the tension that it's causing now between the US and allies and partners as they're being asked to do more, and as it's disrupting the kind of sense of unity that was kind of beginning to stabilize, I would say, over the last few months would certainly come as, as a welcome development. But I do think that China's own interests in the Middle East are not necessarily benefited by this conflict. I mean, they are also dependent on it. You know, there's a lot of uncertainty. So I think, yeah, overall chaos and disruption of the status quo does tend to benefit China as well as I'm sure Russia and others are not sad to see it. But I think it's also a much more complicated situation. So maybe I'll just leave it there.

Speaker 1:
[35:53] Zach, any thoughts?

Speaker 4:
[35:54] Yeah, I spent much of the last week in Track Two Dialogues with Chinese colleagues. And I think the sense I get from them is twofold. First, there is more uncertainty and a bit of surprise that Trump is so willing to use military force. And that level of unpredictability makes them nervous. And of course the energy markets have an impact on China, maybe less than Korea or Japan, but it's going to have an impact. So that also makes them nervous. So it's not all good from a Chinese perspective. However, I think as Kristi was saying, the distraction of the United States and the lack of a strategy, it seems like, for how to bring this Iran conflict to an end, I think makes them feel very, very confident. And they were already feeling quite confident before all of this kicked off. And I think this goes to something that you were saying, Victor, which is, when you look at how countries in the region are reacting, there's not really a plan B from Japan, from Korea, maybe the Philippines, Taiwan, Australia are in that same boat. But there is a plan B from most of the rest of the region. We're seeing it from India, we're seeing it in the rest of Southeast Asia, like in Singapore, Indonesia, certainly in Thailand, Malaysia. The answer is, well, if the US is less reliable and less supportive of this rules-based order that benefits a lot of those countries, then they're going to align not fully with China, but more with China or more away from the United States. And I think that's the trend that we're seeing. And it's really beneficial for Beijing. And I think even if we have a different administration or if the Trump administration tries to change its approach in the next three years, that is going to be a lasting impact. And part of my pessimism is that I think after the first Trump term, there was a feeling that maybe the US had been a little heavy handed in some areas, but that you could sort of put Humpty Dumpty back together again. I don't hear anyone talking about that now. I think we're in a very different Asia. And it's hard for all of us, especially folks that have spent most of our careers in the pivot era, and it's hard for us to think about what this new world is going to look like. But unfortunately, I think it's entirely different than what came before. And we're just at the beginning of trying to think through what those implications are going to be.

Speaker 1:
[38:26] Yeah, I mean, I think that's right. I mean, if we think about the end of the Trump administration and then going into Biden, there were things at the end of the Trump administration that the Biden administration picked up that you could consider very much a part of the pivot, like you mentioned earlier, the Blue Dot Network, the Clean Network was another one. There was a real effort to draw together a coalition of countries, but we seem to be in an entirely different situation right now. And it also speaks not just to countries like India and some Southeast Asian countries, but we're seeing Europe and Canada, Britain, Germany, France, real changes in the way they're looking at US reliability vis-a-vis China. So there's a lot still left to discuss here. Unfortunately, we've run out of time. I hope you two can come back if we can, so that we can continue this discussion. Zach Cooper, Kristi Govella, thanks so much for joining us. Thank you all for joining us as well. We'll see you on the next episode of The Impossible State.